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ABSTRACT

An abstract of the dissertation of Abrahim Jawad Al-Khalisi for the Doctor of

Philosophy in Urban Studies presented November 5, 1993.

Title:

Comparative Analysis of Resettlement Policies in Third World
Countries

Settlement policy in the Third World has been stimulated by the
availability of public land. This availability of public land has prompted
many Third World countries to adopt policies or schemes called resettlement,
transmigration, or land development. These have been presented as
potential means for addressing numerous agendas held by Third World
countries. Settlement policies have been used to increase agricultural
production and make idle land productive. Spatial imbalances of population
distribution have been addressed via settlement policies. For national
security, settlement policies have been used to exploit frontier lands.
Solutions to serious political problems including lack of agricultural selfsufficiency, poverty, landlessness, and unemployment have been sought
through settlement policies.
Huge amounts of financial resources have been invested in Third World
planned settlements, however, their performance has not been very
encouraging. If not completely abandoned by settlers, the settlements gave
officials, planners, and policy makers cause for serious concern. For the most

part, settlements have been costly relative to the number of settlers. In manf
instances, agricultural productivity was low.
I have presented comparative case studies of land settlement policies
which examine the factors that accounted for the success or failure of
resettlement projects. I examined the resettlement projects from the point of
view of the settlers in relation to the objectives of the policy makers.
This study reports the findings of case studies concerning Iraq, Somalia,
Ethiopia, the United Republic of Tanzania, Indonesia, Malaysia, the
Philippines, and Israel. A comparative analysis of land settlement policies in
Third World nations with varying political, social, and economic conditions
is presented.
It will be shown that land settlement policies in Third World countries,

by and large, failed to reach objectives and are not now viewed as viable
options for land development.
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CHAPTER I

INTRODUCTION

The main purpose of this study is to analyze the implementation of land
settlement policies in the context of the socioeconomic, historical and
political factors associated with rural unemployment and poverty. The
creation of jobs for people in rural areas is one of the central components of
national development.
As population continues to increase in the Third World, the demand for
rural land increases. The increase in land demand may be attributed to the
pursuit of the development objectives of population redistribution, increased
agricultural production, the alleviation of agrarian poverty, and rising
standards of living. Many developing countries have developed schemes
labeled as resettlement, land colonization, and land development in order to
pursue these objectives.
Despite the substantial amounts that have been invested in such
schemes, their performance has not been very encouraging. They have
caused serious concern to settlement officials and policy makers in almost all
parts of the developing world. They have been costly relative to the numbers
of people settled, have shown low productivity, and in some cases have had a
high rate of desertion. Many studies have been conducted concerning this
subject, including an important one done through the International Labour
Organization (1977) which examined the experiences of Indonesia, Malaysia,

Somalia, Ethiopia, and Tanzania.
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Little is known about the actual causes of success and failure of
resettlement schemes. It is not even clear whether such settlements are, in
fact, an effective way of settling large numbers of people on virgin or
reclaimed land.
Settlement policies have been used to increase agricultural production
and make idle land productive. Spatial imbalances of population distribution
have been addressed via settlement policies. For national security, settlement
policies have been used to exploit frontier lands. Solutions to serious
political problems including lack of agricultural self-sufficiency, poverty,
landlessness, and unemployment have been sought through settlement
policies.
This study reports the findings of case studies concerning Iraq, Indonesia,
Malaysia, the Philippines, Somalia, Ethiopia, the Republic of Tanzania, and
Israel. A comparative analysis of land settlement policies in Third World
nations with varying political, social, and economic conditions is presented.
The choice to study land settlement projects in the aforementioned
Third World countries emerged from an initial interest in programs in post
World War Two Iraq. For purposes of comparison, other Third World
countries with similar social, economic, and cui tural conditions were chosen
for analysis. The environmental and ecological conditions of the other
countries were also factors contributing to their selection for case studies.
Huge amounts of financial resources were invested in these countries'
planned settlements, however, their performance was not very encouraging.
If not completely abandoned by settlers, the settlements gave officials,
planners, and policy makers cause for serious concern. For the most part,
settlements were costly relative to the number of settlers. In many instances

agricultural productivity was low.
It will be shown that land settlement policies in Third World countries,

by and large, failed to reach objectives and are not now viewed as viable
options for land development.

QUESTIONS ADDRESSED

Following A. S. Oberai (1988) in his edited collection, Land Settlement
Policies and Population Redistribution in Developing Countries, I will
address these questions:
1. Have settlement schemes achieved their stated objectives?
2. How do income and productivity in settlements compare with other
areas?
3. To what extent have planned settlement schemes succeeded in
improving settlers' socioeconomic well-being?
4. What are the principal factors that contribute to the success or failure
of settlement schemes?
5. What lessons can be learned and applied to future settlement
schemes?
I propose to define the success of settlement policy in terms of the
situation of poor, unemployed, or landless people before and after policy
implementation. The beneficiaries must be better off, economically and
socially- including health and education- than before they joined the
settlement - and soon. I believe that all human beings need more than to eat
and sleep. Life becomes more complicated over time. In many cases, land
settlement became an artificial bandage, placed here and there in most Third
World countries, to give the false impression that governments were
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working to improve the situation of poor people. Within a few years, all
such work and expenditures disappeared, and sometimes the condition of the
settlers was worse than before, to say nothing of the physical scars left on the
land. If there is to be any development and improvement, the political and
economic systems of the Third World countries, especially the richer
countries, must permit people to choose freely their own governments and
representatives and negotiate development democratically and fairly with the
people, with a fair distribution of wealth according to the population's
initiatives. In most richer Third World countries, people are suffering, there
is poverty, excess government control, executions, jailings and torture, and
disappearances.

CHAPTER IT

IMPLEMENTATION OF DEVELOPMENT PROJECTS IN THIRD WORLD
COUNTRIES

Implementation is especially central to politics in the Third World
countries of Asia, Africa and the Middle East. Its centrality to the political
environment of these countries makes it worthy of investigation and
analysis. Implementation involves more than mechanical translations of
goals into routine procedures; it involves basic questions about conflict,
decision making and who gets what in society (Grindle 1980).
Many researchers have attempted to define the parameters of a general
process of implementation by cataloging the variables that intervene in it and
some of the relationships among such variables. According to Grindle (1980)
there are two questions about implementation in general that are related to
specific conditions surrounding the execution of public programs in the Third
World countries. First, what effect does the content of public policy have on
its implementation, and second, how does the political context of
administrative action affect policy implementation. Implementation is an
ongoing process of decision-making by a variety of actors, the ultimate
outcome of which is determined by the content of program being pursued
and the interaction of the decision-makers within a given administrative
context.
The following case studies illuminate the importance of the content and

contextual variables in the implementation process of land settlement
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policies in Third World countries. The case studies provide insights to how
and why content and contextual variables intervene in the implementation
process. The generalizations about the implementation process of land
settlement policies gleaned from these case studies may be useful for analysis
of other implementation processes. Yet before developing the generalizations
from these case studies it is important to define more explicitly what is meant
by implementation, content, and context.
In general, the task of implementation is to make a link that allows the
goals of public policies to be realized as outcomes of government activity. It
involves the creation of a policy delivery system. Thus, public policies of
goals, objectives, and means are translated into action programs that aim to
achieve the ends stated in the policy. Then, so that different programs could
be developed in response to the same policy goals, action programs
themselves may be disaggregated into more specific projects to be
administered.
The purpose of such programs are to cause a change in the policy
environment. The distinction between policy and program implies that
policy implementation is a function of program implementation and is
dependent upon its outcome. It is evident from such an interpretation of
policy implementation that it involves study and analysis of action programs
for achieving broader policy goals. This was apparent in the objectives Third
World governments hoped to achieve, which included; greater agricultural
productivity, low income housing, rural development, raising the standard of
living for the poor, employment, health, and education. The Third \A/orld
governments sought to achieve these objectives through land settlement
programs; considered a specific program for achieving these goals.

The content of public programs and policies is an important element in
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determining the outcome of implementation initiatives. Implementation of
various programs for instance, to the extent that public actions seek to make
changes in social, political, and economic relationships, they generally
stimulate a great deal of opposition from those who's interests are threatened
by them. An example is landowners who oppose agrarian reform measures.
A distinction can also be made between programs providing collective
benefit, which may mobilize more particularistic demands at the
implementation stage. Programs establishing collective goods such as the
provision of light and water, health services in rural areas, and in urban slum
neighborhoods may be readily implemented in the Third World because the
compliance of groups or localities affected will tend to be forthcoming with a
minimal amount of conflict (Hadden 1974). A program with great benefits
such as housing may create conflict and competition among those seeking to
benefit from them and may be more difficult to execute as intended
(Rottenbag 19SO). Differences in the degree of behavior change the program
for its intended beneficiaries is another way the content of policy affects its
im plemen ta tion.
The introduction of new technologies for agricultural development is a
commonly cited example of programs requiring considerable adaptation and
participation by the recipients. In constrast, providing housing for low
income people may require little change in the behavior patterns. In the case
of programs that are designed to achieve long-range objectives,
implementation may be more difficult than in circumstances where the
advantages are immediately known by the beneficiaries. As an example, the
small support and participation that preventative health programs are able to
elicit from target populations in Third World countries often stands in stark

contrast to the receptiveness of potential recipients of land titles in rural
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settlements. This is because the latter policy directly affects residents'
economis situation and sense of security.
The content of various policies also dictates the site of implementation.
An example is housing or agricultural policy that depends upon a network of

widely dispersed, decision units whose responsibilities are also
organizationally dispersed. Local and national level agents of the ministry of
agriculture, agrarian reform department, community development agency,
public works ministry, and the agricultural credit bank may all be implicated
as implementors of a rural development policy in any given country. As the
site of implementation becomes more dispersed, geographically and
organizationally, the task of executinga particular program becomes more
difficult, given the increase of decisional units involved (Pressman and
Wildavsky 1980).

THE CONTEXT OF POUCY

As the preceding discussion indicates, the policy content is an important
factor because of the real or potential effect it may have on a given social,
political and economic setting. Therefore, it is necessary to consider the
context or environment in which administrative action is pursued. The
implementation is an ongoing process of decision making involving a
variety factors affecting the allocation of resources. One of these factors may
be the attempt by certain people or interest groups to influence decisions.
Those who might be involved in the implementation of any particular
program would include national level planners; regional and local
politicians; economic interest groups, especially at the local level; recipient

groups; and bureaucratic implementors at middle and lower levels. The
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people and groups may be intensely or marginally involved in
implementation, depending on the content of the program and the form in
which it is administered. Each may have special interest in the program, and
each may seek to get it by their demand on allocation procedures. The goals
of such actors will be in direct conflict with each other and the end result of
this conflict and consequently, who gets what, will be decided by the strategies,
resources, and power position of each of the individuals involved.
What is implemented may thus be the result of political maneuvers by
interest groups competing for scarce resources, the response of implementing
officials, and the actions of political elites, all interacting within given
institutional contexts. In such conditions, analysis of the implementation of
specific programs may imply assessing the power capabilities of the
individuals, their interests and the strategies for achieving them. This may
in turn facilitate assessing the potential for achieving policy and program
goals (Anderson 1972).
In achieving such goals officials confront two minor problems. First,
officials must address the problem of how to obtain compliance with the ends
enunciated in the policy (Kaufman 1973). They must turn the opposition of
those who may be harmed by the programs into acceptance of them, and they
must keep those who are excluded but who wish to acquire benefits from
subverting them. Obtaining this kind of compliance may mean much
bargining accomodation and again considerable conflict. But if overall policy
goals are to be realized, the resources traded to acquire compliance must not
jeopardize the impact or focus of specific programs.
This first problem is exacerbated by special interests and groups
competing for scarce resources, the response of implementing officials, and
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the action of political elites, all interacting within given institutional contexts.
Analysis of the implementation of specific programs may imply assessing the
power capabilities of the individual, their interests, and the strategies for
achieving them. This in turn may facilitate assessing the potential for
achieving policy and program goals (Anderson 1972).
The second problem of achieving policy and program goals within a
specific environment is that of responsiveness. Bureaucracies must be
responsive to the needs of those to benefit in order to serve them the best way
possible. In addition, without a great deal of responsiveness during
implementation, public officials are deprived of information to evaluate
program achievement and of support important to its success. In many cases,
however, responsiveness may mean that policy goals are not achieved
because of the intervention of the individuals or groups. Either in order to
acquire specific types of goods or services in greater amounts, or to obstruct
the accomplishment of particular programs that may not be as beneficial to
them. The problem for policy administrators is to ensure an adequate degree
of responsiveness to provide flexibility, support, and feedback, while at the
same time maintaining enough control over the distribution of resources to
achieve the stated goals (Emmerson 1974).

POLITICS AND IMPLEMENTATION IN THIRD WORLD COUNTRIES

Political participation and competition in implementing public policies
in Third World countries may be viewed as by-products of the political
systems themselves. Distance and remoteness, inaccessibility of the policy
making process to most people, and extensive competition caused by
widespread need and very scarce resources are just few of the contextual
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factors affecting the implementation process. However, in many Third
World countries, the output stage of the implementation process is where the
demands of individual and collective interests emerge and conflict resolved
(Weiner 1962).
In the Third World countries, political parties are more important as
mechanisms by which elites control mass followings than as means by which
interests are articulated from below to government leadership. This is true in
regimes in which single or dominant parties direct the political stage. In
other countries parties may be vehicles for the personal ambitions of
individual politicians who have no real commitment to achieving goals
beyond obtaining government jobs and distributing them to loyal followers
(Lande 1973).
Interest groups may be similarly ineffective as structures for presenting
collective demands to the political leadership. Interest associations are
frequently captive organizations of ruling parties. They exist only at the
power and indulgence of the government, or like parties are formed for the
single purpose of protecting the political interests of their leadership. Beside
these problems, other constraints on their aggregative capacities include
limited communication facilities, dispersed potential membership, and lack
of education and experience. These characteristics mean that frequently there
are few organizations that are capable of representing the interests of broad
categories of citizens and formulating policies responsive to their particular
needs. Those few that are effective in this role tend to be the wealthy and
powerful groups such as bankers, landowners and industrialists.
Related to the weakness of interest aggregating mechanisms in Third
World countries is the frequently encountered attitude of leaders in both
political and administrative positions that participation in the policy

formulation process is illegitimate or inefficient. Their concern for rapid
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development and the central role of the public sector in achieving economic
and social goals may lead them to give policy making responsibility to elite
planning bodies in the national capital. These elite planning bodies may then
be protected from the pressures (pettiness or selfishness) exerted by interest
and clientle groups, and from the delays and conflich resulting from open
debate, inputs for legislative bodies, and exposure to mass media.
The policies of a regime have great impact on the daily lives of citizens
in nearly every Third World country. Many Third World countries have
extensive and active public sectors involved in many aspects of economic and
social life. State bureacracies may be among the strongest institutions in the
society. Many of the most important policies established by political elites
include agrarian reform, urban development, housing, social security, health,
employment and education. Each of these policies are of concern to virtually
all citizens. Furthermore, in a context of very scarce resources, who gets what
and how much is likely to be of central concern to the populace. Government
plans where to locate industries, who should receive government contracts,
or who should be included in preventative health programs will likely ignite
the potential for conflict and the desire to influence such decisions. Thus,
while participation is frequently limited to policy making, there still exists a
great desire among citizens to affect the outcome of government decision
making because such outcomes affect them all down to a personal level.
Many Third World countries have found the implementatin phase of
the policy process to be particularly suited to their needs. In attempts to
obtain government goods and services, individuals and groups find it
worthwhile to focus their demand making efforts on officials and agencies
empowered to distribute benefits, or on politicians who may have influence

on individual allocation. Patron factions, client linkages, ethnic ties, and
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personal coalitions that are often the basis of political activity are well suited
to making individualized demands on the bureaucratic systems for the
allocation of goods and services (Heeger 1973).
The implementation process may be the major way in which
individuals and groups are able to pursue conflicting interests and compete
for access to scarce resources. It may even be the principle of the interaction
between the government and its citizens, between public officials and their
constituents. More over, the outcome of this competition and interaction can
determine both the content and the impact of programs established by
government elites, and thus influence the course of a country's development.
With the concentration of political activity on the implementation process, it
is likely that policies and programs will be more difficult to manage and
predict, and even more subject to changes or alteration in the Third World
countries than elsewhere.
Implementation of public policies in the Third World countries is the
focus of the case studies in this text. Specifically, land settlement programs
intended to benefit certain groups of peoples in the societies studied. The
intended beneficiaries include primarily the rural poor and landless peoples.
The overwhelming characteristic of Third World countries are the large
proportions of their populations that live below, at, or slightly above
subsistence level. These portions of the populations are in dire need of the
goods and services provided by government programs. Yet, most Third
World governments are authoritarian and too busy seeking solutions to
problems of political participation and conflicts to be deeply involved in
providing the basic needs for its citizens. This suggests that the capacity of
poor populations to acquire benefits from their government may be strictly
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limited in an environment that minimizes the influence of numbers on
political decision making through the elimination of open elections and
rotation of political leadership.
Most of the case studies in this text illuminate the general methods of
implementation and the political activity associated with it. Most of the
Third World countries exhibit implementation of policies that are
distributive or redistributive, including public land for the landless, rural
development, and increase in agricultural production. The implementation
of policies is done through governments which determine how scarce
resources will be allocated and who should be the beneficiaries. Beneficiaries
of policy implementation, generally low income and low status groups, are
presented in these case studies as powerless people who strive to elicit
resources and responses from their government in the face of considerable
opposition from those who are threatened by them.
The literature of land settlement policy implementation provides a
framework to help analyze the many variables which interfere with
implementation. The variables identified in the case studies of Third World
countries presented in this text. These variables are components of the
content and context of the the policy environment. The variable include
national level planners; national, regional, and local politicians; economic
elites; recipient groups; and bureaucratic implementors and resources.
Land settlement has been initiated to solve some of the problems
confronting Third World countries, including the need to increase
agricultural production, correct spatial imbalance, and difuse serious political
problems resulting from the existing agrarian structure. The major focus of
this study on the resettlement schemes is from the point of view of the
populations concerned in relation to the objectives of the policy

implementation. This study reports the findings from examination of land
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settlement programs in Iraq, Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines, Somalia,
Ethiopia, the United Republic of Tanzania, and Israel.
These studies present the similarities and differences in the policies of
land settlement programs. This examination of land settlement policies is an
attempt to identify the problems facing such projects and to learn what
should be done to improve the settlement programs.
There are three sections in Chapter XII which provide discussion. First,
the performance of settlement projects, concentrating on the extent to which
they achieved their objectives. Second, the major economic and social
problems confronting settlement programs. Third, whether resettlements are
an appropriate policy response to population redistribution. Chapter XIII
presents discussion examining the factors affecting success or failure of land
settlement policies.

CHAPTER ill

INTRODUCTION TO CASE STUDIES

The importance of developing national resettlement programs in Third
World nations have often been couched in their potential for providing tidy
solutions to numerous problems. Problems faced by these nations have
included the need to increase agricultural production, correct spatial
imbalances in population distribution, exploit frontier land for reasons of
national security. Third World nations have also cited the need to diffuse
potentially serious problems resulting from existing agrarian structures,
poverty, and increasing landlessness and unemployment (Oberai 1988).
Pressing land tenure problems in the arid areas of Iraq were the impetus
for the development of land settlement projects following World War II. A
resettlement project known as the Dujaila pilot plan, the first of its kind in
Iraq following World War II, was implemented to address problems of land
tenure.
The idea of trying to alleviate population pressure and poverty in Java,
Indonesia by organizing and encouraging the movement of people to the
outer islands of Indonesia is one example of a resettlement program. During
the 1970s, fueled by the oil boom, Indonesia's transmigration program became
one of the largest voluntary land settlement programs in the world (Arndt
and Sundrum 1977, Arndt 1981, Hull 1981).
The objective of Indonesia's population transfer was economically based

rather than for the the relief of population pressure. The lack of

17

infrastructural facilities, such as housing, drinking water, roads and irrigation
was the primary factor in settler's decisions to abandon the land settlement
scheme.
Malaysia, a relative newcomer to implementing land settlement
schemes, developed a style of implementation that received worldwide
attention due to its performance. The emergence of resettlement programs
among other southeast Asian nations can be traced back to the turn of the
20th century. Though the Malaysian programs did not begin until the mid
1950s, in less than a span of 30 years large tracts of land have been developed
and occupied by previously poor and landless peasants (Bahrin 1968, 1977).
In Malaysia, population redistribution in and of itself was never an

objective of land settlement and development. In part, it was seen as a means
for promoting regional development. The principal objective was to develop
land for the landless and unemployed people.
Among the various objectives of the Philippine government were the
use of resettlement programs to improve the quality of life among the poor,
increase agricultural production, and accelerate national and regional
development through exploration and colonization of the frontier. This
involved the distribution of publicly owned agricultural land to landless
families. Resettlement has also been used by the government to encourage
migration to sparsely populated regions of the hinterlands for the purpose of
developing new communities that would serve to fulfill desired objectives
(Din 1981). The program in the Philippines was driven in part by a 1971
report prepared by a consultant for the Harvard Advisory Group which
advocated the abrogation of the land grant system and proposed a
comprehensive planned utilization of government lands through an

appropriate settlement policy. Support of individual initiative and low cost
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settlement programs were key elements of the Philippine resettlement policy
and were attributable to the report (Pascual 1966, Simkins 1968, World Bank
1973).
The policy of resettling Somalia's nomadic population predated the 1974
drought. However, the international aid extended to Somalia in response to
the drought brought its policy into greater focus and added momentum to its
implementation. The major objective of the resettlement policy as it evolved
since 1974 was to attain a major redistribution of Somalia's population so as
to reduce the ecological deterioration of the rangelands and to redirect urban
growth into productive rural enterprises. By developing large-scale irrigation
schemes and coastal and deep-sea fishing, the Somalia government hoped to
diversify the national economy in order to achieve greater national selfsufficiency and reduce the country's increasing trade deficit. Secondary, but
not less important, were the goals of population redistribution (Cassanelli
1975), provision of social services to Somalia tribes, and accommodate war
refugees (Scuddert 1981, Afzal 1983).
The settlements of Somalia were successful in creating social
infrastructures for many families, but income and production potential were
not met. Education and health care at the settlements were well above the
national average. Increases in elementary school involvement were noted.
From 1961 to 1966 the United Republic of Tanzania adopted land
settlements as part of their national planning strategy for socioeconomic
development. The objectives were increased agricultural production, and
population redistribution from heavily populated areas to areas of low
population densities. Other objectives included provision of essential social
services such as health care, education and clean water (Maro 1982, 1983).
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The United Republic of Tanzania sought a complete transformation of
rural society to improve the overall social and economic well-being of the
nation through the villagization program. The villagization program was an
attempt by the government to evolve a coherent rural development strategy
with the aim of communal production and to engage in the collectivization
of rural development. Despite the villagization project, levels of agricultural
production were low and rural income remained inadequate.
Ethiopia, one of the largest nations in Africa with a population of nearly
35 million during the 1970s, experienced problems with settlements. There
was a great potential for developing land and moving people from high
density areas to low density areas. The major objective was to settle about
500,000 people after the 1974 drought. The settlements proved not to be wellbalanced. Most settlers concentrated in large numbers in the highlands. The
land became fragmented, creating great pressures which led to low
agricultural productivity and landlessness (Kassaye 1978).
Israel was considered a pioneer state with extensive experience in land
settlement planning and implementation. Israel's objectives were guided by
the priority to utilize uncultivated land as part of rural development.
The intended policies of resettlement programs throughout Third
World nations have differed to varying degrees, but some commonalties
have emerged. Most often, the clear of objective of relocating people was
initially met. Yet whether the relocated population remained and prospersed
depended in large degree to the strategies for implementation.

CHAPTER IV

DUJAILA LAND SETTLEMENT IN IRAQ

Dujaila was a pilot land settlement project. Begun in 1945 it was the first
project of its kind in an Arab Middle Eastern country (in the Arabian
Peninsula) and the forerunner of a large scale social experiment. It was
significant in that it was all Iraqi-conceived and executed. The first Iraqi
projects attempted to solve the pressing land tenure problems of the arid area
of Iraq. The thought was if the coming years proved as successful for Dujaila
as the preceding six years, this pilot project would pave the way for five more
larger projects of a similar type planned in Bagdad. Other Middle Eastern
governments were watching the development closely. Their agrarian
problems were not totally dissimilar, and they hoped to learn much from the
work of this project.
The project was conceived before the Second World War, but was not
initiated before completion of the barrage on the Tigris River at Kut (Fig. 1).
The barrage could raise summer water levels in the river by almost 14 feet. It
functioned to draw water over the southern banks of the Tigris by gravity.
The barrage was completed in 1939. War prevented action on the Dujaila
project until 1945. Since its inception in 1945, the project, with its initial one
hundred settler families, grew quickly under definite rules (Fisk 1951)
Each applicant was given a 100-meshara plot (each meshara = 2500 square
meters). The settlers were required to be farmers and landless, at least 18 years
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old yet under 50 years old, with no criminal record. Each settler was required
to live with their family on the land they tilled and worked. Preferably, the
settlers were residents of one of the two southeastern provinces of Iraq,

formerly known as Kut and Ammra, now called Messan. Where the Dujaila
projects were located with this stipulation, the government avoided mixing
people from different tribal backgrounds. Alternatively, great care was taken
to settle people of different local tribes adjacent to each other to promote
amalgamation and long-range harmony between the settlers.
In 1945 the government established the Dujaila Project Board, which
required that settlers abide by the instructions given to them. In this way, the
government through the Board was able to introduce techniques and crops
that the settlers were not previously acquainted with. Each settler signed the
development and cultivation contract created by the Project Board which
included information about crop rotation, planting fruit trees and vegetable
gardens, cleaning and digging of feeder canals, and housing style and
construction. Each settler family was granted 100 Iraqi dinars1 as an
establishment loan, repayable in five years. Settlers were not allowed to sell,
lease or rent their land for a 10-year period. During this time the settlers' only
source of credit was the Agricultural Bank of Iraq. Any settler who disobeyed
these instructions after three warnings from the project authorities could be
ousted and the land opened for resettlement (Al-Haidari 1950).
In return, those who abided by these regulations were granted a 100donnom area plot of land, a free water supply, and the establishment loan.
They were encouraged to make full use of the cooperative associations,
demonstration farms, educational programs, and technical advice available
on the project. After 10 years settlers received their land and all rights as a gift
1 An Iraqi dinar was equal to 4 U.S. dollars at that time.

23

from the government. In case of a settler's death, the land passed to his heirs
under identical contractual requirements.
These regulations were a spirited effort to develop small independent
settlements comprised of responsible landowning people. It was hoped that
their improved living standards would set an example and influence labor
conditions on adjacent, privately owned land. It was thought that the change
in labor conditions would encourage other farmers to desire independence
from communities.

PROJECT DESCRIPTION

The Dujaila Land
Flat subtropical desert land lying east of the Mesopotamian market
center of Kut City (Fig. 2) was the site of the Dujaila project. The Dujaila
project was comprised of 125,000 donnem which had been allocated by the
Iraqi government. The land was divided equally between a few wealthy
landowners and the Iraqi government. As the Dujaila project was too new to
have had any substantial influence upon the privately held lands, except as
beneficiaries of the project's water and machinery availability discussion of
these lands will not follow.
The land used by the settlers in the project for agricultural purposes was
an area that could be covered by gravity pump from the Dujaila Canal and its
12 distributor channels, a total area of 110,000 donnem. Nearly all of this land
was potentially productive desert land at the beginning of the project. Eighty
thousand (80,000) donnem could be irrigated by pump, and of this land, 20%
was too sandy for use. Administration, utilities, schools, roads and
experimental farms occupied a minimal area.

D Land Subject to Temporary Flooding
t!~~ Unoccupied Flow Irrigated Land
~Occupied Flow Irrigated Land
[ ] Dujaila Project Boundary

~ Privately Owned Land
.Adminstrative Land

-{=:1 Dujaila Distributary Canal
~Salted Land
-{3oujaila Canal
-Boujaila Water Flow Limit

3

0

3

6

Miles

EJ High Land
Figure 2. Plan of Dujaila land settlement (Fisk 1951).
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Water Policy of the Project
Dujaila water was distributed to state land only, except in specific
instances where the government Council of Ministers allowed private
landowners specified quantities. In return for this water, landowners (called
Shayhk) determined whether to distribute one-fourth of their land to the
farmers or pay a pro rata share (1.25) of Iraqi dinar per donnem of the
expenditures incurred in constructing the canal system. Water distribution
was accomplished through the Dujaila canal, leaving the right bank of the
Tigris River 300 meters (about 1050 feet) upstream from the Kut City barrage.
The canal control by headgates was designed to pass 28 cubic meters per
second, which is enough water to supply both flow irrigation and the slightly
higher irrigation lands. The canal, while designed to carry enough water for
both kinds of irrigation, was excavated to a three-meter depth, allowing but
18.5 cuses (unit equal to one cubic foot per second) discharge. This was the
full cultivation water required for flow irrigation. When money was made
available for pumps, the canal and its seven distributary branches inside
project land were enlarged to full capacity. The distributaries, of unequal size
due to variations in the water of each area, were designed to a slope of 10
centimeters per kilometer, while the average slope of the Dujaila itself was 7
centimeters per kilometer throughout its 51 kilometer length. Modern steel
headgates were used to regulate the flow of water from the main canal into its
several distributaries and from these to the feeder channels irrigating
individual farms.

The Administration and Facilities
Project lands were divided into many sections and segregated according
to the distributary canal servicing each particular section. The original settlers

were located on Sections Seven and Eight, which were nearest to Kut City.
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Subsequent settlers were located on land at a greater distance along the canal.
The administrative services were an integral part of the project.
Experimental farms, scattered in several of the project's sections, were one of
the two means by which the government disseminated its advice and
concepts of modern farming. The farms, of the same size as the settlers' 100
donnom plots, made use only of tools available to the settlers themselves and
produced those crops which the government required each settler to grow. By
practicing advanced cultivation techniques and producing heavier crop
yields, often with fewer man-hours of labor, the experimental farms
successfully convinced cultivators of the value of their techniques.
The experimental farms would have been more effective if limited to
the single function of education via demonstration. As it was, they were
under-staffed even for that function and had to also serve as horticultural
advisor for planting trees and vines and as seed nurseries for the entire
Dujaila project. There were not as many experimental farms as there were
sections within the project. Because of the distance involved, the settlers'
visits to these farm sites are sharply curtailed, greatly reducing their effect. In
addition to the experimental farm plots, skilled agriculturalists living in the
project offered demonstration lectures on specific local farming problems.
Often these lectures were supplemented by machinery demonstrations. It was
hoped that future growth of these educational efforts would include the
introduction of visual aid techniques, particularly since many of the settlers
had never seen such demonstrations.
Local administration was carried out by a small government staff
stationed in the project. The staff was charged with enforcing the law and
rules of the Dujaila project and with supplementing the activity of the

resident technicians. Provisions for health and education, both adult and
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primary, were inadequate beyond the section center.
The consumer and farm cooperatives were the most important services
rendered to the farmers in Dujaila. The cooperatives were conducted entirely
by the indigenous agricultural population. For a yearly subscription of one
Iraqi dinar, each farm family could take advantage of the consumer
cooperative's services, purchasing personal and household goods at well
below the prevailing market price. The consumer cooperative, in common
with the farmer supply cooperative, maintained a retail outlet in the
administrative center located in each section. Membership in both forms of
the cooperative was open to officially recognized Dujaila settlers only, because
of the minimal cost of and the benefits offered by these cooperatives (Fisk
1951).

The Farm Supply Cooperative was very important as it furnished
needed farm machinery and seeds to small landholders. Tractors, with their
supplementary equipment, including driver and petrol, were available for the
nominal price of 300 Iraqi fils (about $0.70 at that time) per donnom. Tractors
and maintenance stations manned by full-time specialists, were located in the
fully settled sections of the project. Unfortunately, mechanical equipment
was in short supply, opening the way for petty abuse, which was encouraged
by the fact that the cooperative could rent the same equipment for the
profitable rate of 600 fils per donnom to the neighboring landlord owning
land in the privately held land watered by the Dujaila Canal. Most cultivators
signed up for equipment as much as three to six months prior to their actual
need for it, to insure their obtaining its use. The Farm Supply Cooperative,
which was a voluntary organization, charged members two Iraqi dinar per
year for the privilege of using its facilities, although new settlers are allowed

lenient terms their first few years. This sum plus governmental assistance
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supported the nonprofit operation of the organization as a cooperative
society.
The cooperatives were the government's agents for increasing both the
quality and quantity of crop output. As this depended upon the use of
improved varieties of seed, specialized cotton and cereal seeds were available
through the cooperatives at attractively low prices. The availability of low
cost seed to settlers benefitted the government's goals of increasing crop
quality and quantity.
The good success of the cooperatives turned the Project Board's attention
toward a marketing cooperative. It was hoped that this activity would be
functioning before the 1952 harvest season. Farmers, for many years
accustomed to selling their crops to town grain merchants far in advance of
the harvest, had been unable to change their ways. As a result, they lost 50%
or more of the final market value of their harvested crops. Local grain
merchants and landlords, feeling threatened, objected strongly to the plan for
a marketing cooperative. Only the insistence of the Dujaila Project Board put
the marketing cooperative plan into the starting stage. Unfortunately,
landowners possessed disproportionate political strength. Marketing
cooperatives presented an immediate threat to their way of earning extra
wealth and such plans were vigorously opposed.
One satisfying introduction by the administration were the tree plantings
along the public roads uniting several sections and their administrative
center. Many different trees were planted such as eucalyptus, poplar,
mulberry and tamarisk, all quick-growing varieties that thrive under
irrigation. They were interspersed with sisbania and casuarina bushes, acting
to disrupt the monotonous flatness of the southern Mesopotamian plain.

29

This vegetation sheltered settlers from awesome dust storms and provided
nice shade in the summer.

Dujaila Project Population and Social Life
Estimates indicate that between 1000 and 1200 families were in residence
as of June 1951. The population was estimated at about 15,000 people. Each
family averaged between five and seven persons. In addition, approximately
the same number of hired laborers and their families were supposed to be
living on project land. The landowner was free to employ one man and his
family, from any place he chose. The settler himself however had to meet the
qualifications according to the Project regulations. When sufficient
applications had been received by the Project board, actual settlers were
chosen from among qualified applicants by lottery. By 1951, farmers wishing
land in Dujaila had to show that they had completed both their primary
education and military service (Al-Haidari 1950).
Additional labor was needed in the Project only at harvest time. Then
local shepherds were employed for a few weeks to harvest and thresh grain.
In return for their labor, they were paid both in cash and kind, receiving

board and a space in the grain fields to pitch their tents. They were allowed to
graze their animals on the stubble for a limited post-harvest period. This was
in late May and June.

Dujaila 's Homestead
The Dujaila homesteads, shown in Figure 3, were laid out in square
shapes or rectangular patterns aligned to conform to a grid pattern of
irrigation canals. Each group of four formed a small settlement of 4 to 12
buildings containing between 40 and 50 people. The law requiring
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settlers actually to dwell on their own land was intended to insure that the
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cultivator and owner were the same person. This dispersed settlement
pattern in Iraq was also intended to reduce public security requirements.
Some incidence of crime was reduced successfully within the Dujaila Project.
The settlement pattern requirement worked great hardship upon the settlers,
although it eliminated travel time from village to farm. Accustomed to
dwelling in villages, the sociable tribal people resented being relegated to such
minute settlements. The great distance,often exceeding 10 kilometers
between farm houses and administrative centers of individual sections
contributed to diminished attendance at demonstrative lectures and schools.
Frequent exchange of individual farm experiences was also curtailed, a very
serious fault among an illiterate population.
This settlement scheme had a twofold effect on water use. The
provision of pure, piped water over great distances for individual household
use proved cost prohibitive. Furthermore, diversion of water for household
use reduced its availability for the all-purpose irrigation ditches. Individual
wells may have solved the drinking water problem if small pumps were
installed at each of the four corners of the settlements. The social services
problem was more fundamental. Small settlements in hexagonal patterns,
with farms surrounding each village at distances no greater than 4 kilometers
relative to surrounding villages may have provided an answer for future
settlement projects under consideration in Bagdad at the time.

Soils
The soil's rich loam, with occasional sandy patches, constituted the thin
topsoil layer. Because of the high salt content of the surface layer, shallowrooted cereal and cotton crops could not be expected to produce as abundantly

as was possible on the well-drained lands found in the north of the country.
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Alternatively, the loamy subsoil had a below-average salt content. This
favored immediate results when the soil was washed, thereby lessening the
pernicious influence of topsoil salts. Unfortunately, the loam had a poor
structure, tending in places to cake thickly enough to prevent seedlings from
pushing through the dried-out surface. This condition prompted the
introduction of long-rooted leguminous crops, like alfalfa and clover, to
improve the soil structure. In addition, these crops supplied needed humic
content (Powers 1954, Buringh 1955).
Such crops as Berseem were excellent winter crops, while alfalfa
provided good summer forage. Both crops increased the production of
animal protein and products by supplying a reliable fodder crop. The
introduction of such crops also gave the settler a better understanding of new
fixed location agriculture as contrasted with the extensive, shifting irrigation
cultivation practiced over most of the country. Alternation in salt and
nutrient content, as well as changes in soil structure, were responsible for the
variations in crop quality and density readily observable in the fields (Lebon
1964).
By the sixth year of the project salt was not a problem. However, the
lowest lands were removed from cultivation and the settlers occupying these
salted plots were relocated. The key issue in the Project was that drainage was
not provided for in the original plans of the Dujaila land as a whole. This is
why older portions of the settlement salted up beyond reclamation (Simmons
1965). Temporary local drains could have been constructed to lead excess
water off to the lowlands east of the canal, where the waters would have been
disposed of through evaporation. If such a project was to be permanent and
free from malarial swamps, large drains would have to have been dug back to

the Tigris from the projects. Pumps could have been employed to lift the
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water back into the river again. The area of land at the eastern end of Dujaila
was fertile, and could be commanded in its entirety by flow irrigation. But it
was subject to temporary coverage by water during high floods and therefore
susceptible to malaria breeding.
Soil erosion was a minor but neglected factor within the Project. Erosion
control included only the banks of the main canal and its distributaries. The
richness of the desert's extremely fertile loam, deposited mainly by the Tigris'
accumulation of fertile alluvium was substantial, yet the rich soil was not
necessary except for certain field crops such as cotton. Animal manure was
either collected for fuel or sometimes scattered upon the vegetable or fruit
trees. Some manure was left to enrich the area left for pastures attached to
each farm of the settlement.

Crop Rotation Practice
The rotation of crops was not new to the Iraqi farmer, but it was a very
important factor for permanent farmers. The practice had been used by
leaving a field fallow. That meant one year a farm was left without
cultivation until the following year. But the system adopted for the Dujaila
settlement was more in line with the extensive, shifting agriculture practiced
on private lands near Dujaila. For example, the grain crops, such as wheat
and barley, were on the same plot of land as shown in Figure 4. A threedonnom area of cotton was located in different fields with each passing
summer, thereby taking advantage of the scattered patches of good soil on
each farm. The vegetable patch remained close to the farm bulking to make it
easier for car access and fertilizing with animal manure. The fruit trees
remained fixed, and the pasture area was required by law to remain
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Figure 4. Typical land use on a Dujaila farm (Fisk 1951).

near the farm buildings. The most appropriate rotation may have been a
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three-year rotation of cotton, berseem clover, and wheat and barley. Such a
system would have involved two winter crops and one summer crop on each
field. One winter and two periods of summer fallow within each rotation
cycle could yield greater crop production from the same land area. A threedonnum plot of alfalfa could be rotated about the poorer soil patches once in
each cycle, improving structure and organic content and providing additional
fodder for the settler's animals.
The crops used in the settlement farm were typical of Iraqi agricultural
field crops. Wheat and barley were the dominant cash crops and occupied
most cultivated land in north and south Mesopotamia including the Dujaila
Project. Wheat was used for bread and barley was used for bread and exported
for beer production. Both crops were grown in shallow basins that were
flooded three to four times a month during winter. The actual watering
interval depended upon temperatures and evaporation rate. The common
harvesting method was by hand sickle, and grains were loosened in the husks
by animal's hooves. Wind winnowing then completed the threshing process.
Sometimes threshing was done by wooden sledge, with has rotating steel
blades and a roller, to give shorter lengths of straw used for winter feeding of
the animals and for mud bricks for home construction. The extra cereals
produced for sale are marketed by the individual farmer in an unprofitable
old manner, in which the town middleman absorbed the bulk of profit. But
in the later years of the project, the cooperative marketing was very helpful to
remedy the situation.
Grains were grown as winter cereals, keeping the farmer busy plowing
and sowing in the fall, watering in the winter and harvesting in the spring.
Cotton, a summer crop, was grown on a small area to give the farmer a year-

round farming income, albeit small. Crops, such as com, sorghums, mung
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beans, millet, sesame, and other vegetables were raised on a small scale as a
summer crop.
The tree orchard was introduced to the Dujaila settlement as an integral
part of the Project's crop and diet diversification. Diversification was central
the Project's goal of increasing the self-sufficiency of individual farms and
teaching farmers the desired potential of their new life. As shown in Figure
5, some gardens planted in 1946 yielded excellent crops of grapes; and the
greenery around these established farms formed a refreshing contrast to the
dull mud villages of the large estates adjacent to the Dujaila Project. The
produce from these gardens were only for home consumption, because the
area devoted to each variety of fruit was too small to encourage sale. Rapidly
growing mulberry and eucalyptus trees and the casuarina and sisbania bushes
acted as partial windbreaks around the houses. They also provided cooking
fuel for the individual household.
The vegetable garden, like the orchard, was cultivated under open border
and trench irrigation, receiving water once every three to four days. From
this five-donnom plot each family was expected to supply its own needs for
vegetables. At the inception of the Project growing vegetables was considered
an inferior occupation, so farmers needed to be educated on how to tend their
vegetable plots until they had seen the advantage of growing and consuming
their own vegetables. As a result of the wide variety of food freely available
to each household from their gardens it was hoped that the general health
would be raised well above those farmers laboring nearby on the landlord
plantations.
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1. Building ; 2. Fig Tree ; 3. Mulberry Trees ; 4. Date Palms ;
5. Pomegranates ; Plum Trees ; 7. Greengage Plums ; 8. Vines
9. Crabapples; 10. Apricot Trees ; 11. Apple Trees

Figure 5. Fruit garden layout on Dujaila farm (Fisk 1951).
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Livestock in Dujaila
The goal of agricultural diversification in the Dujaila Project led to the
introduction of livestock such as cows for milk, and poultry and ducks for
eggs and meat. Donkeys normally were kept in each farm for transportation.
Some farms had about 30 head of sheep for wool and lambs, with a few goats
for milk. The animals grazing the grain stubble helped the settlers to support
more animals than would otherwise be possible. Diversified agricultural
production made it essential for the settler, in order to profit, to add
leguminous crops which helped the soil's fertility.

Settler Adjustment
The settlers' adjustment was very slow in the beginning because nearly
all of them were not familiar with the new environment or many of the
crops. However, by 1951 the settlers had realized the value of such crops.
They had become free of the debt they used to have under their landlord.
Most of them possessed cash incomes, and they had good diets. Freedom
replaced the feudal system, and enhanced health increased their ability to
enjoy new status and well-being. With good housing, with greenery around
such houses, better clothing and some home furnishings, they became more
active and interested in their lives. Some of them considered themselves
prosperous enough to have extra wives. In general, the settlers of the Dujaila
Project became ambassadors promoting such settlements in other parts of
Iraq.*
*As county agent at this time, the author was informed of the preceding by Hasan Mohammud Ali,
director of Dujaila project, and Fuad Izzet, first technical secretary of the Department of Agriculture, Iraq.

THE SUCCESS AND FAILURE OF THE DUJAILA PROJECT
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Did the settlers adjust to the new way of life? The adjustments were
very slow in the beginning, because they were not familiar with the
environment. Nor were they familiar with cash crops and the time required
to produce them. But when their diet and their health improved, they
recognized the value, and they were more than ready to accept their new
ways. Financially they were better off than before. They were free of debt and
possessed some cash incomes. They enjoyed the freedom to be their own
bosses and the ability to enjoy their new status. Especially with good housing,
often with attractive greenery around their houses, with better clothing and
some home furnishings they became more interested in life beyond the limits
of their farms. Dujaila settlers considered themselves prosperous people.
The Dujaila Project yielded practical experience for the Iraqi government.
Certain points had been clarified during the first six years, which pointed out
what must be done to improve the Project and extend the Dujaila idea to
other parts of Iraqi. Social, health and education services were in the first
stage of development and inadequate. Recreational facilities were totally
lacking. There were no medical services on the Project.
I've primarily discussed the successes of the Dujaila project during its
first six years of existence. The problems the pilot project faced included an
inadequate drainage system and consequent diminishment of crop
production. The drainage system failed to prevent the toxic build-up of salt.
Crop failure due to increased salt content discouraged settlers and left them
frustrated with their efforts (Fisk 1951). By the end of the six year period
examined many settlers had abandoned their plots and moved elsewhere,
leaving the whole project in a state similar to a salt mine (Phillips 1959).

CHAPTER V

LAND SETILEMENTS IN THE REPUBLIC OF TANZANIA

Tanzania, similar to many countries in Africa, has adopted land
settlement policies as part of their national planning scheme. The primary
objectives were increased agricultural production and improved
socioeconomic development. A secondary objective was population
redistribution via relocation of landless and displaced peoples from heavily
populated areas to areas of low population density.
From 1961-1966, the Tanzania government tried to transform agriculture
through capital-intensive settlements; these were limited and affected only
100,000 people. But in 1967, the government proclaimed the Arush
Declaration. In the spirit of the philosophy of socialism, the Declaration set
the stage for collectivization of the entire rural population into nucleated
settlements called Ujamaa villages. The Arush Declaration and its precepts
were viewed as a precondition for rural development. Both the policy and
the strategies of implementation visualized a future society based on
nucleated settlements in which land and labor were mobilized for
cooperative and communal production. Equitable income distribution would
be encouraged through such a settlement pattern as would cheaper and
cheaper provision of social services. The land settlement and population
redistribution in Tanzania had two eras (Boesen 1979, Hyden 1980).
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THE COLONIAL SETILEMENT ERA

Tanzania had some experience with land settlement during British
Colonial rule. Such rule was used during 193D-1940 to concentrate peasants
into compact settlements. This was one of the colonial system's methods to
increase the agricultural production. In the 1950's, the colonial government
encouraged cash crop agricultural settlements.
The objective of colonial agricultural policy was to increase production,
especially of cash crops. Such policies were improvements in traditional
agricultural practices in soil conservation, terracing and land use planning.
There was no emphasis on the introduction of new methods, new techniques
or innovation, nor any concern for welfare of the peasant producers or the
provision of social services. The consequence of such colonial agricultural
policies was anticolonial resistance on the part of the peasants, which finally
mobilized into a mass nationalist movement delUt'Ulding

self~rule

government.

POST-COLONIAL SETILEMENT

In 1962 the independent United Republic of Tanzania had been advised

by the World Bank to establish land settlements on vacant land by removing
people from crowded or high-density areas to new land. The World Bank
suggested movement of people to new land would encourage them to be
more open to change and adoption of new ways of agriculture. The
government establ·r.shed the Village Settlement Agency to supervise and
advise settlers and government agents regarding implementation. According
agency directives, pilot planned settlements were established in various parts
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of the country as centers of modem farming. They numbered 20, with
populations of 20,000 people. Each settlement was to have 250 families, with
managers and other experts in agriculture. All machinery used in the
settlements was paid for by the government.
Unfortunately, five years after their inception, most of the pilot
settlements were abandoned, but some were converted to Ujamaa villages.
By 1966 the Village Settlement Agency had been dissolved. The
transformation of agriculture through the settlements had failed for three
reasons. First, overcapitalization: in many of the schemes, there was more
machinery than necessary in relation to land and labor. Consequently, both
labor and equipment were underutilized. Second, production was low and
scattered in many farms that could not be easily supervised. Third, the
settlements were managed by inexperienced officials, with no settler
participation in management (Dumon 1969).

SPONTANEOUS SETTLEMENTS

In addition to the many government-supervised settlements, there were
many voluntary settlements that were on a cooperative basis and received
some assistance from the government. Some of these settlements were
motivated by an urban youth organization named Tanu Youth League (TYL).
Settlements established by TYL were self-reliance and exhibited a good quality
of life. The Tanu Youth League had been established to recruit youth from all
over the country. They established more than 500 small settlements. Such
settlements were less capital-intensive and involved politically dedicated
young people who devoted their time to productive efforts in their
settlements. The causes of the eventual failure of many TYL settlements,
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however, were mismanagement and misuse of funds (Dumont, 1969).
In 1963, a successful spontaneous settlement was established by the

Ruvuma Development Association. About 400 families from very poor areas
scattered across the country moved into 17 new settlements. The guiding
principles were communal farming and self-reliance. Each settlement elected
its own manager and a management committee from among themselves.
They cultivated a wide range of crops, raised cattle and established weaving
and spinning, brick making, flour milling and timber production, and
reinvested their savings in social services and transportation. After 1968, the
Ruvuma Development Association was banned, allegedly for representing
the elite (Dumont, 1969).
There were two lessons learned by the government through their
settlement experience. First, they accepted that nucleated settlement and
broad extension of social services were the prerequisites for rural
development and for checking the rural-urban drift of youths. This idea led
to the formulation of the Ujamaa policy, which referred to living and
working together in communities for the good of all. The second lesson was
that capital was scarce and could not therefore form the basis for rural
development; rather land and labor should be mobilized as the basis for
socioeconomic development. The failure of the post-independence land
settlements set the stage for nationwide planned settlements with wider
objectives that encompassed more than increasing the production of cash
crops (Maro, 1983).
What is ujamaa? The concept of ujamaa means familyhood and is based
on traditional African socialism. The underlying principles include respect
for the rights and place of each member of the community by all members,
and the obligation of each member to contribute to the development of the
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community by working hard. Therefore ujamaa means living and working
together in communities for the good of all. In order to work together, the
people had to be brought together to live in ujamaa villages (Maro, 1983).

Objectives of Ujamaa
The objectives of Ujamaa settlements, couched in the philosophies of
socialism and rural development, were laid out in the 1975 Villages and
Ujamaa Villages Act, which specified the following:
1. To build a society in which all members have equal rights and
opportunities, and in which all members have a gradually increasing
basic level of material welfare;
2. To develop new socialist relations of production based on communal
land utilization;
3. To promote a spirit of self-reliance in social and economic activities
such as building schools, hospitals, and social services.
The objectives of Ujamaa villages had different interpretations by the
peasants and by the government. The great majority of the settlers assumed
that the ujamaa policy would enhance their autonomy, and they expected the
promised good life to start immediately after they moved into villages. The
officials, on the other hand, interpreted the revolutionary objectives as
inviting the state to play a major role in transforming the rural areas. Many
officials applied the bureaucratic and managerial strategy of command and
control in the formation of Ujamaa villages. The command and control
strategy sometimes discouraged peasants' voluntary initiative and
compliance (Maro and Maro, 1982).
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Implementation of Ujamaa
The strategy used in the formation of Ujamaa villages was spelled out in
the document entitled Socialism and Rural Development. A Ujamaa village
was defined as a voluntary association of people who decide of their own free
will to live together and work together. Such villages were to be established
through education and persuasion and not by force. But in 1969, the
president of the country issued a circular stating that incentives became
important to make people move to Ujamaa villages. From 1973 to 1976 force
was widely used for moving the rural population into Ujamaa villages.
From the beginning the president proposed three stages: the initial stage,
when the people moved so as to live together; the second stage, when the
village community had gained some experience of living together and
participating in communal activities; and the third stage, when the villagers
could be persuaded to become communal farms with small plots and other
communal productive activities (Ellman 1970, McHenry 1979).

Structure of Ujamaa Villages
The objectives and strategies evolved and consequently the concept of
Ujamaa villages changed. Though villages formed before 1973 were referred
to as Ujamaa villages, they did not have any communal activities. With
governmental campaign to move people forcibly to villages, the new villages
were referred to as development villages to distinguish them from earlier
villages already in existence. In some regions of the country three types of
village were recognized: the regular village, which had no cooperative or
communal activities; the cooperative village, which had been registered as a
cooperative; and the Ujamaa village, which carried on all its operations on a
communal basis. The 1975 Villages and Ujamaa Villages Act recognized only
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two kinds of villages: villages and Ujamaa villages. The criteria for being
recognized as a Ujamaa villages as set forth by the Act included self-reliance
and communal activities. Such villages were required to have constitutions
and contain a minimum of 250 families in a defined area. They needed a
village assembly consisting of all residents aged 18 and over and a village
council of 25 members selected by the assembly. The Ujamaa village councils
had to be capable of setting up committees to deal with finance, planning,
production, marketing, education, and social welfare. Ujamaa villages
needed a chairman and secretary. All land and major machinery and
buildings were required to be under the control of the village council. When
such criteria had been met, a village could apply for registration to become a
Ujamaa village according to the 1975 Act. The Act stressed communal
production, to provide a nationwide standard for living and working
together.

Formation of Ujamaa Villages and Population Redistribution
In 1967 about 5 percent of the rural population in Tanzania lived in

traditional villages, and the majority of the rural population lived in
individual scattered homesteads. Therefore, to implement a successful
ujamaa policy, most people had to move from where they lived to new
villages. From 1967 to 1969, persuasion was used for making people move to
new homes. Seminars, meetings, tours and campaigns were organized in
different parts of the country to persuade leaders and rural peoples to
establish the ujamaa policy.
By 1969 there was a total of 800 Ujamaa villages throughout the country,
with a total population of about 300,000 people, representing about 2 to 5
percent of the rural population. The leadership was impatient with slow
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progress, and the promise that ujamaa villages would transform the rural
areas was losing credibility.
Between 1970 and 1972, the government began to take a more active role
in the formation of Ujamaa villages. While the government increased the
incentive for people to move to villages, the 1970 famine struck some
regions. The president took the personal initiative of living in such villages
and participating in the activities of persuading and helping people to move
into villages where they could participate in communal production. As a
result of such participation, the number of villages in the Dodoma Region,
where the president lived, increased from 75 in 1970 to 246 in 1971. Some
regional commissioners did the same thing as the president. With
intensified campaigns, the number of villages in the country increased to
4,864; and by 1973 about 2 million people, representing 15.7 percent of the
rural population were living in Ujamaa villages.

POPULATION REDISTRIBUTION

The population redistribution differed from one area to another.
Between 1967 and 1973 it was estimated that only 1.5 million people were
moved to new settlements. But between 1973 and 1976, not less than 5
million people moved to new settlements. Although at the national level
villagization involved massive changes in population distribution, at the
local level, redistribution generally took place within each administrative
region. By 1977, however, the rural population had been collectivized into
nucleated land settlements. This was a considerable achievement and one
that laid the foundation for rural transformation (Ellman 1970, Mushi 1971,
McHenry 1979).
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AGRICULTURAL PRODUCTION IN THE SETILEMENTS

Villagization eliminated landlessness in the rural population. The
elimination of large individual landholdings, land speculation, and the
government requirement that all able peasants must work contributed to the
elimination of landlessness. The organization of production on both
individual and communal farms increased work discipline among the
peasants
The size of the farms, both individual and communal, differed from one
area to another, according to the physical environment and the type of
agricultural inputs available to peasants. In general the individual holdings
were 1.2 hectares as an average, but they could be as large as 5 hectares or
more especially in livestock grazing areas. The size of communal farms per
household was even smaller. In the years following villagization, especially
1980-1981, agricultural production did not increase significantly. In fact, some
export crops, such as coffee, cotton, tea and tobacco, actually declined. Several
factors contributed to the decline in agricultural production:
1. Low level of investment in agriculture;
2. The low use of mechanization;
3. Shortage of agricultural extension people;
4. The inadequate marketing and the transportation, and;
5. Shortage of pest control.
Despite these factors, communal farms received official support and
enjoyed modern inputs. Communal farms were used to demonstrate the
advantages of mechanization, high-yield seeds, fertilizers, and appropriate
planting. In some areas, application of these techniques proved that
considerable increases in yields per hectare could be obtained (McCall 1985).
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RURAL INCOME DISTRIBUTION

As far as land settlements were concerned, the Tanzanian government
made efforts to promote improved rural income. The nationalization of land
in 1962 gave almost every Tanzanian equal rights to the use of land, while it
also put an end to feudal systems. Since villagization, land allocation
throughout the country were controlled by village authorities. This assured
every peasant of at least subsistence farming and eliminated the basis for
landlessness and extreme poverty.
The Arusha Declaration, on which the ujamaa policy was based,
emphasized equitable distribution of income and access to basic social
services. The village became the basic center for free primary education, free
primary health care, and clean water. The social services helped to reduce
ignorance, disease, and poverty in the rural area. The government
introduced farm import subsidies and eliminated export taxes. Produce
prices, especially for food crops, increased steadily, contributing to increased
farm incomes The government controlled prices and established wage,
income, and price policy for achieving a degree of equity in income
distribution in both rural and urban areas.

VILLAGIZATION AND BASIC SERVICES

After the Arusha Declaration, the government decided that apart from
giving everyone access to productive opportunities, there was a need to
provide free basic needs in the form of primary education, health, and clean
water, for social justice and as a necessary input for socioeconomic
development. The collectivization of the rural population into nucleated

settlements enabled the government to provide basic services to the
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maximum number of people at a minimum cost. Such basic services in
Tanzania were very successful and very effective in improving the quality of
life for the majority of Tanzanian people.

COSTS AND BENEFITS OF LAND SETTLEMENTS

There were two kinds of financial costs involved in land settlement: the
costs of moving people to villages and the cost of providing them with their
basic needs. The cost of moving 5 million people has been estimated at about
800 million Tanzanian shillings, and the cost of providing people with their
basic needs totalled 300 million shillings. This did not include the costs of
social services and infrastructure. These costs were a large burden on the
government. The greatest benefit of villagization was the provision of basic
services, the availability of education, clean water, and health services, which
led to a reduction in mortality and an increase in life expectancy. All this
enabled the peasants to engage effectively in productive activities and to
improve the quality of their lives. Though the cost to government was high,
the establishment of the Ujamaa settlements were positive and apparently
justified the costs (World Bank 1977).

CONCLUSION

The Arusha Declaration settlements that failed were abandoned because
they were inappropriately conceived, overcapitalized, and relied on foreign
funding. While the villagization program amounted to agrarian revolution,
it was hardly possible to exaggerate its importance in shaping the economic,
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social, and political future of Tanzania. There were over 15 million people
living and working together in over 800 villages in rural Tanzania. In 1981,
agriculture production contributed between 75 and 80 percent of foreign
exchange. The Ujamaa village were important as the core of development
and well-being for the entire population. The villages as a sociopolitical
institutions were established and moving toward full achievement of the
goals their establishment intended to achieve. Under their village
governments, the villagers were engaged in the cultivation of individual
plots and communal farms and in various cooperative productive activities.
They were involved in the formulation and preparation of projects relevant
to the development of the village. Villages were therefore firmly and
permanently established in Tanzania and are presently making a significant
contribution to socioeconomic development.
With all the successes evidenced by villagization, several problems are
now faced. The most pressing problem in all villages is that of low yields and
low productivity in agriculture. Most of the villages suffer from the related
problems of incompetent leadership, management, and technical skills. This
calls for village-based training in government administration and
management, such as bookkeeping, shop management, modern agriculture
and animal husbandry. Villages may be much more understanding and
accepting of fellow villagers trained in matters of local development rather
than government agents of change who may not be sympathetic to village
development problems.
Other problems presently experienced by the villages come from the fact
there has not been significant transformation in other sections of the national
economy, especially industry. This has created serious problems in the supply
of inputs, the collection and marketing of agricultural products, and the
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development of infrastructure. The production of consumer goods by local
industries was part of the incentive package to distribute goods more
efficiently. However, most local industries have failed to produce essential
consumer goods in the villages.

CHAPTER VI

LAND SETTLEMENT IN ETHIOPIA

Ethiopia is the third most populous country in Africa, having nearly 35
million people. In 1984 Ethiopia's total land area was 1.24 million square
kilometers. With this large area, only 14.8 percent of the country's land area
was under cultivation; 50 percent of the total area consisted of grazing land
and browsing. Nearly 19 percent of the land was not utilizable for agriculture.
There are three geographical areas in Ethiopia, classified according to
altitude, temperature, rainfall and vegetation. The Kolla area, which is the
land below the altitude of 1500 meters above sea level with high temperatures
throughout the year (20° C. or higher) associated with low vegetation.
Secondly, the Weynadega area, which consists of all lands of 1500-2500 meters
above sea level, with medium temperatures and the agriculture in the area
dependent on rain-fed crops. Thirdly, the Dega area, which consists of
highlands with altitudes of 2500 meters and more above sea level with low
temperatures throughout the year.
Ethiopian settlement patterns follow these geographical divisions. Most
of the farm people practice rain-fed agriculture, which are located in the Dega
and Weynadega area. In the plateau area of Eritrea, Tegre and Wallo,
nucleated settlements are common. Closely spaced huts characterize
settlement patterns in parts of the Gondas, Gojam and Gamogofa plateau
area. In the highland areas, scattered settlements and widely spaced groups of
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huts are typical patterns of settlement. In 1984 about 78 percent of the
Ethiopian population lived in the Dega and Weynadega area because the
highland areas had good volcanic soil, favorable temperatures and high
rainfall.
The lowlands, as in the Kolla area, have a very low population. The
Kolla area covers about 60 percent of Ethiopia's land area. It has harsh
climatic conditions; high temperatures throughout the year, insufficient
rainfall, low vegetation, and debilitating hazards such as malaria and the
tsetse fly. It supports a mainly nomadic people, who accounted for nearly 10
percent of the total population in 1984 (As-Faw 1975).
The settlement patterns in Ethiopia are not well-balanced.
Concentrations of large numbers of people in the highlands have put great
environmental and economic pressure on the land. Land fragmentation
resulted in low agricultural productivity and landlessness (Kassaye 1978).
This bad situation was made even worse by the droughts in 1972-73. The
droughts served as an impetus to focus public attention on relief aid for the
survivors, while it also encouraged policy makers to think in terms of longterm solutions, mostly concerning the resettlement of those for whom there
was no hope of making a livelihood on the land that had been ravaged by
drought.
In 1941, after the expulsion of the Italian occupation forces, large tracts of

land, particularly in the southern regions, were claimed as government land.
These constituted the bases for settlement programs in Ethiopia. Emperor
Haile Selassie distributed land to patriots, prewar soldiers, public servants,
and some landless and unemployed people. The Emperor used his powers
not only to grant government land as he wished but also to change the status
of landholdings from one form to another. He made many authorizations

for the conversion of temporary usage rights to land into freehold usages.
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Such powers by the Emperor to develop land administration did not always
result in beneficial settlement patterns.
Political gains were given more consideration than long-term economic
gains. Many grantees did not themselves settle on the land but kept title to it.
Others used their ownership privileges to maintain tenants and gain profits.
Often the beneficiaries of the grantee system were landowners. The system
therefore had the effect of accentuating the inequality of incomes and giving
more powers to landowners. The landlord-dominated parliament failed to
develop any reform in agriculture, which remained backward and faced
declining productivity. These conditions were not isolated only in the
Ethiopian monarchy. Unfortunately they were a duplication of the
con<:fitions in Iraq during the King's reign after it had gained its independence
from the English colonial forces following World War IT.
In 1966 the Ministry of Land Reform was established, charged with the

task of formulating appropriate land reform policies. Among its priorities
was the adoption and implementation of settlement and resettlement
programs. The government attached great significance to the settlement
issue, both to solve the problems of a too-high labor to land ratio in the
northern plateau regions and modernizing agriculture and increasing
productivity and the economy as a whole. In 1971 a consultant advisory
group from Harvard suggested repeal of the land grant system in Ethiopia and
proposed a comprehensive planned utilization of government lands through
sound and appropriate settlement policies.
Another problem identified by the advisory group report of was
excessive spontaneous settlement. This coincided with earlier studies by the
planning commission which concluded that spontaneous and unorganized

settlements were not a very good means of improving agriculture
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production. The Ministry of Land Reform and Administration saw
settlements as an important development strategy. Soil studies by the
ministry found government land that could be used for settlement was rather
limited. Large areas of the land were located in arid regions with very small
prospects of irrigated agriculture. Other areas were located in remote regions,
covered with forest and swampy land, which could be very costly to develop.
However, the government was overthrown in 1974, before any working land
policy and program could be implemented.
There are two types of settlements in Ethiopia; spontaneous and planned
Spontaneous settlements started in 1942 by movements of very large
numbers of people. A number of factors precipitated the development of
spontaneous settlements. These included (1) high rates of population
increase throughout Ethiopia, including the northern plateau, which already
had high population densities; (2) little opportunity for landownership in the
northern region of the country; (3) large scale evictions of tenants from the
land in the central region as a result of commercialization and
mechanization; and (4) improvements in transportation and communication
and the government's land grant system, by which large numbers of grantees
were encouraged to settle in new areas. A study carried out in 1975 by Wood
observed that spontaneous resettlement had become widespread in Ethiopia
during the prior three decades.
Planned settlements in Ethiopia started after the overthrow of the
monarchy government in 1974. However, there were three five-year
development plans, the first of which (1957-61) did no more than mention
the need to use settlement programs to improve agricultural productivity.
The second five-year development plan (1963-67) did not produce any new
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development in the planned settlement, but it was recommended that studies
be conducted to pave the way for an effective land settlement program in

future years. In the third five-year development plan (1968-73), settlements
were viewed as a regional development strategy to relieve population
pressures in the northern plateau regions, increase agricultural productivity
through the use of underdeveloped land resources, and improve land
management practices. This was the general picture at the national level.
At the local level the first known planned settlement was started in 1958
by the governor of the Sidamo region. The purpose was to bring under
cultivation lowland areas that were only in marginal use. A further aim of
the settlements was to resettle surplus people from the overcrowded
highlands, Welamo and other similar areas. These settlements were later
passed on to the Welamo agricultural development unit when it was
established in 1970 under the Ministry of Agriculture to implement a regional
development program. Several other settlements followed these sponsored
ones. These early settlements were conceived as low cost, labor intensive
projects in which government inputs were kept to a minimum. There was
careful selection of the settlers, and there was provision of a demonstration
program as part of the agricultural extension service (Wetterhall 1972).
A real change in increased planned settlements took place with the
establishment in 1974 of the Relief and Rehabilitation Commission, a direct
consequence of the 1972-73 famine that claimed many thousands of lives.
A significant event in facilitating the process of settlement was the 1975
Proclamation, which nationalized rural land. The public ownership of rural
lands made it possible for the government to resettle people as needed. In
addition, it cleared the way for setting up peasant associations. The other
important development was the establishment of settlement authority in

1978 as a unit within the Ministry of Agriculture and Settlement (Simpson
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1975).

The priorities of such authority were the settlement of unemployed
people, displaced groups, landless persons, and nomads. According to its
planned programs, the settlement authority was to provide settlers with
agricultural inputs on a credit basis, loans for setting up cooperative
organizations, a water supply, health care, and education. The cooperative
organizations, which were part of the scheme for achieving self-reliance, were
to be owned and managed by the settlers themselves. The settlement
authority set a target of settling 20,000 families per year. Actual settlement
was less than expected, constrained by developments that led to further
reorganization of the settlement programs. The Proclamation of 1979 set up a
new Relief and Rehabilitation Commission. This commission was to bring
under one organization the tasks that had been carried out by three different
agencies, namely the Awash Valley Authority, the Settlement Authority, and
the Relief and Rehabilitation Commission. It was a body accountable to the
office of the chairman of the Council of Ministers and was given wideranging powers and duties in the settlement program. As of 1983, there were
85 planned settlements.

OB~CT~SOFPLANNEDSETILEMENT

There were many objectives of planned settlement to be achieved: to
make use of and develop idle land and water resources; to provide income
and activity to unemployed people and peasants suffering from the drought;
to accommodate landless farmers in settlements; to shift people from
overcrowded areas to better settlements; and additionally, to settle the

nomadic tribes. In general the settlement programs were directed at three
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target groups: First, the urban unemployed groups of people of working age
and in need of productive jobs. As in most third world countries, the
problem of urban unemployment in Ethiopia was in the alarming range
between 10 and 20 percent. The second target group consisted of those who
had been displaced due to drought. These were inhabitants of the highland
regions of Ethiopia where the soil had been depleted of its fertility due to
mismanagement, poor soil use practices, and recurrent drought. This target
group included thousands of families without any resources for their
livelihood.
The third target group encompassed the nomadic people. They made up
about 10 percent of the total population of Ethiopia. The earliest planned
settlements for the nomadic people were in the Awash Valley under the old
Awash Valley Authority. However, a better concerted effort to settle nomads
was made by the Relief and Rehabilitation Commission in 1983, which settled
some 7000 nomads in 15 settlements. These numbers made up about 21
percent of all settlers and 18 percent of all settlements in Ethiopia. The
reasons for such planned settlement by the Ethiopian government were
recurrent drought and dislocations.

The Settlement Process
The Relief and Rehabilitation Commission started with the
identification and selection of target groups. Then the Commission made
each target group understand the advantages of involvement in a settlement
program. The type of group the Commission looked for was a family
belonging to the 18 to 45 age group, in good health, and a willingness to live
by the Commission rules. Once heads of families registered, a feasibility study

of the selected settlement site was conducted. This included a study of its
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location, climate, geology, soils, topography, vegetation, water resources,
communications, and land use. The study was carried out by a team
comprised of an agronomist, agricultural engineer, agricultural economist,
geographer, animal husbandry specialist, and sociologist. The study included
development of a general plan on how and when the various important
targets were to be realized. A detailed plan was established that set up a work
schedule for every operation, including necessary material, financial, and
manpower requirements for the fulfillment of the operation. The planning
stage of the program was then completed and the implementation started.
The final stage involved assessing the program and making modifications
throughout implementation.
The Relief and Rehabilitation Commission was given the task of settler
selection. The Ministries of Agriculture, Interior, and Labor and Social
Affairs, as well as the peasants' associations, were expected to participate in
recruitment of people for resettlement. In principle, no one was chosen for a
settlement program unless he/she volunteered for it.

The Settlement Model
The scheme of the Ethiopian settlement model set forth an objective that
each settlement unit be composed of 500 families. Five such units made one
project area with an office of administration and management to coordinate
its activities. The first settlers were accommodated in common shelters; later
they constructed their own dwellings. Each settler was given one 1000 square
meter plot on which to construct his homestead. The settlers were provided
with food, clothing, and other essentials until they attained self-sufficiency.
Self-sufficiency in food was expected to be attained after only two

seasons. However, in instances where this was not attained, governmental
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food aid covered the difference between actual production and food
requirements. Expenses incurred for livestock development were expected to
be repaid. However, money expended on investments for development
works, including building for livestock development, did not require
repayment.
Settlers were organized into producer cooperatives. Within the first year
it was anticipated that the settlers would be introduced to the basic principles

of cooperative farming. The leaders of the cooperatives would be given some
education in cooperative management, job assignment, and income
allocation.
Each settlement was expected to have a unit manager, a cooperative
organizer, an economist, a mechanic, and an assistant administrator. In total,
14 skilled persons were assigned by the Relief and Rehabilitation
Commission. Over a three-year period, settlers were given training in the
field of agriculture, cooperative management, health, and economics. A
settlement project was expected to achieve self-sufficiency in three years. At
the end of the third year, a team of experts from the Relief and Rehabilitation
Commission and the Ministry of Agriculture would determine whether selfsufficiency had been attained. If the conclusion was positive, the Ministry of
Agriculture would take over administrative control; if not, the Relief and
Rehabilitation Commission would run the project for a few more years.

THE SETTLEMENTS SCHEME ACHIEVEMENTS

About 95 percent of Ethiopian settlements were run by the government.
The land allocated for settlements was considered choice land with enough

moisture and good soil conditions. The government therefore expected the
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settlement schemes to yield high levels of land and labor productivity.
Actual performance has been far below expectations (Wood 1977).

CONCLUSION

Ethiopia, like many other Third World countries, has a population that
is unevenly distributed. For example, the high plateau area has high
population densities, with depleted soil and very poor environment, while
the lowlands area, which has a great potential for irrigated agriculture, is
underpopulated. One of the planned settlement policies was to take a
measure of population relocation, and the second objective was to make
better use of land and water resources.
The settlement of nomads, a reduction in urban unemployment, and the
development of agriculture for cash crop production including exports, were
too costly. The settlement program faced serious problems, such as
mismanagement and low land and labor productivity. The lack of sufficient
time to prepare, plan, and implement settlement programs was a cause of
high costs. This situation was expected to improve if political stability
increased and the conditions of drought improved.
The alternative settlement model has its own advantages, which show
that low-cost settlements are in general terms more cost effective and more
efficient than special settlement schemes. Therefore, it is essential to make
the low-cost settlement option a viable proposition in future settlement
programs.
Settlement costs must be brought down to the cost levels of producers,
cooperatives and other different competing forms of agricultural production
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units. Among such cost-reducing steps, careful selection of settlement lands
and settlers, and least-cost execution of settlement schemes may prove
beneficial. The introduction of incentives, the provision of inputs and

training, and the guarantee of good prices for all settlement products may also
contribute to the success of settlements.
There are many other measures that could contribute to lowering the
cost of settlements, such as good services, favorable marketing, and improved
transportation. All these together, with improved management of
settlements may lower their costs of operation. Under the present practice,
settlers are made totally dependent on the government, which provides free
food, transportation, equipment, training and other services. This in part is
responsible for the high cost of settlements. An alternative scheme of
settlement might be considered such as voluntary settlements, and a
partnership between settlers and the government in sharing costs and other
responsibilities.

CHAPTER Vll

RESE'ITLEMENT OF NOMADS IN SOMALIA

Geographically, Somalia is a land of rolling savannah with high areas in
the north located east of Ethiopia on the Gulf of Aden. It has two rivers, both
coming from the Ethiopian highland. The land between those rivers is very
fertile and the most well irrigated in the country. Generally, Somalia is
considered arid or semiarid; low rainfall and droughts are common.
Somalia has a population around 6 million in 1970. About two-thirds
were nomads in an area about 637 to 657 square kilometers. The 1974 drought
caused large migrations of nomadic people from the rural areas to the cities in
search of water and food (Mohamed 1977). In 1975 the government
established about 20 relief camps. The total population of these camps was
estimated around 300,000 people. During the desperate period of the drought
an estimated 20,000 people, mostly children and elderly, died. Furthermore,
the drought killed half of Somalia's nomadic sheep and goats, a third of its
cattle and about 120,000 tons of food grain.
When the seasonal rains returned, most drought-stricken nomads
returned to the rural areas to rebuild their lives and herds. The Somalia
government decided to resettle those who remained in permanent
agricultural and fishing settlements. About 15,000 settled in three fishing
settlements and about 105,000 settled in three agricultural settlements.
Establishing permanent settlements for a large number of settlers exceeding
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100,000 people was a very hard task. Because of the complex nature of the job,
the government decided to create two independent agencies to be in charge of
the development of the settlements. Thus in 1976, the Settlement
Development Agency and the Coastal Development Project was created.
In the period from 1975 to 1977, the settlements were run as extensions

of the relief camps. The new agencies decided to upgrade the services such as
medical facilities, building schools, digging wells, building food storage, and
creating administrative centers to change the camp's character. Land clearing
started immediately and crop cultivation started at the agricultural
settlements before the end of 1975. The period was one of crucial
readjustment for the nomadic settlers, as well as for the new agencies.
However, many settlers left and returned to their herds and pasture lands.
The settlements as a whole lost about 40 percent of their population. In 1976,
the arrival of modern boats and the construction of permanent housing and
processing facilities was the cornerstone to stabilize this drift at the fishing
settlements.

THE RESETTLEMENT POUCY

The main objective of the resettlement policy evolved since 1974.
However, the international aid to Somalia in response to the drought focused
closely on two important issues. First, to redistribute Somalia population to
avoid and reduce the rangeland deterioration, and reduce urban growth by
developing productive rural enterprises. Through developing large scale
irrigation projects and coastal and deep sea fishing schemes, the government
hoped to diversify the country's economy in order to achieve national selfsufficiency and reduce the country's trade deficit. Second, to provide social
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services to a large number of nomadic population, and to deal with Somalia
war refugees.

The Nomad Resettlement
The Somalia government established six nomad settlements, three of
which were fishing settlements. These were Eil, Adale, and Brava. The first
two fishing settlements were located north of Mogadishu and the third south
of Mogadishu. The three agricultural settlements, Dujuma, Kurtunwary, and
Sablaale, are south of Mogadishu. The agricultural settlements were much
larger than the fishing settlements; the former had 17,000 to 25,000 settlers,
while the fishing settlements had 3,000 to 5,000 settlers.

Organization of the Settlements
The organization was established at three levels: the Settlement
Development Agency and the Coastal Development Project (their
headquarters were at Mogadishu); the settlement management organization;
and a sociopolitical structure within the overall framework of the provincial
administration.
Each settlement had its own management headed by a manager who was
responsible for day-to-day operations. He was supported by a team of
professional officers heading the departments of agriculture, livestock
production, forestry, and farm administration. Because of the nomadic origin
of the settlers, a high level of supervision was very essential; that was why
junior staff supporting the senior management were needed.

Settler Characteristics and Training
Since 1975 resettlement meant a change in occupation for nomadic

people who had been drought-affected. A considerable training effort by the
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agencies administering the resettlement was required and essential. The
Settlement Development Agency undertook an extensive training program.
While awaiting the arrival of mechanized machinery and equipment, the
Coastal Development Project concentrated its training on the use of modern
boats.
Training on both types of settlements was necessary to provide the
settlements with engine operators, mechanics and net menders. In addition,
processing workers and administrative workers were important for a
settlement's survival. The training provided by the Settlement Development
Agency included an adult literacy program for those who had no formal
schooling. Skills training was also provided in agriculture, construction,
handicrafts, clerical work, transport, communications, and health care.

Income and Work Incentives in the Settlements
At the inception of the settlements the government was providing all
services and facilities, such as food, clothing, and housing. Most settlers in
agricultural settlements received their rations and a small daily cash
incentive per day of about 2 shillings. Such incentive were tied to the work
done. Those given skills training received more, about 10 shillings per day,
according to the skill acquired and their occupation. Fishermen in the fishing
settlements received a cash incentive on a standard 0.80 shilling per kilogram
of fish caught.
The work attitudes of the settlers had serious implications for the
planned self-sufficiency of the settlements. Throughout the settlements,
absenteeism was very high and productivity low. Such conditions became a
matter of concern; various alternative ways of encouraging productivity were

considered. One possibility was to increase cash payments, but the
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government could not afford such an increase. Another alternative was to
create cooperatives and turn the settlements over entirely to the settlers, but
the drawback of such an alternative was the question of whether former
nomads could handle such responsibility with any hope of success.
The most promising possibility was to provide input, extensions, and
marketing services, while the household was to be responsible for generating
its own income and responsible for bearing the cost of the services provided
by the agency.

ASSESSMENT OF SOCIAL STRUCTURE AND INFRASTRUCTURE

In general terms, the progress achieved in providing facilities and social

services in the three agricultural settlements was impressive. In the fishing
settlements, it was even more advanced.
The housing projects at the agricultural settlements proved
controversial. Many officials argued that housing would be better provided
by the settlers themselves, and the settlement agencies' first priority should be
to make the settlements economically viable. The argument was that when
incomes in the settlement increase, the settlers themselves would build their
own housing. While the housing projects were certainly an attraction that
might have served the government's goals to retain the former nomads in
the settlements, only the promise of a higher income could ensure the
settlers' commitment to the project.
Education and health care at the settlements appeared to be above the
national norm. Healthwise, care also appeared to be more than adequate in
the agricultural settlements, because each settlement had a lower ratio of

persons per dispensary than the national average, while the fishing
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settlements had access to the medical facilities at their nearby towns.
The Somali government had some reservations about food rationing
supplied by the government, the European Economic Community, and
World Food Program. There was speculation that the short-term effects of
providing free rations as well as housing would be a loss of incentive for the
resettled people to work hard. The long-term effect may have been too much
dependency on the state assistance. That is why the rations were phased out
at the end of 1984.

Population Redistribution
The population redistribution in Somalia was an important issue for the
future of the country. That was why the agricultural sector was required to
carry the brunt of any major population redistribution. The government was
placing greater emphasis on large scale irrigation projects run as state farms
rather than replicating the Settlement Development Agency schemes, which
in terms of production incentives appeared to be moving away from the state
farm model.
The World Bank Review suggested the agricultural sector could absorb
population increases for the 20 years from 1980 to 2000 based on estimates that
85,000 hectares of irrigated land would be developed and another 750,000
hectares of land would be added to the rain-fed agricultural land. If the
agricultural projects are completed, Somalia could well meet and even go
beyond the World Bank target (World Bank 1983).

CONCLUSION
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While Somalia has great potential for fishing and agricultural resources,
its rangelands are rapidly becoming overpopulated and overgrazed. This
surplus population must be distributed to other areas of the country. The
1974 drought dramatically increased the overstocking and mismanagement of
the rangelands. Unfortunately, the subsequent range management and
nomad resettlement programs have been less than successful in slowing the
deterioration of the rangelands.
In 1979-80, the drought and war arrived at the same time. That meant a

considerable additional burden of livestock and human refugees for the
rangelands to support. The urgency of relieving the pressure on Somalia's
rangeland is greater than ever, and the Settlement Development Agency and
the Coastal Development Project resettlement programs are the only
experience the Somalia government has in attempting to redistribute the
population to achieve better use of resources and manpower.
Unfortunately, the Settlement Development Agency and Coastal
Development Project have not been economically effective for many reasons:
1. There was little comprehensive planning;
2. Inadequate management;
3. Social services and housing were very expensive and not cost
effective;
4. Little incentive for production.
In general, a lack of policy and planning remains as one of the foremost
obstacles. As with the range management projects, and with Somalia
development efforts, project implementation and evaluation have continued
to be adversely affected by the lack of working documents, such as reporting
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and recording. This condition and difficulty has made it impossible to define
development stages and strategies for long-range planning to meet ultimate
objectives.
From a social point of view rather than a narrow economic view, the
overall performance of the settlement might not be unreasonable. This is
especially true if the nonquantifiable benefits of the schemes are taken into
account. The resettlement and creation of employment opportunities for

many nomadic families. Creation of a social infrastructure that has improved
hygiene, nutrition and education opportunities for such people as well as
helping them to acquire agricultural and fishing skills they did not previously
possess. These suggests that planning is crucial to the success of future
resettlement programs.

CHAPTER Vill

LAND SETTLEMENT IN MALAYSIA

The Malaysian program of land settlement started in the mid-1950's as a
basic strategy for improvement of the economic status of the rural poor
(Bahrin, Perea, and Lim 1977). Within about 30 years, the program received
worldwide attention for its style of implementation and overall performance,
in which large tracts of land were developed and occupied by previously poor
and landless farmers. Farmers who settled in the large tracts of land became
possessed of relatively good income, compared with those who remained in
the old villages.
The Malaysian resettlement program differed somewhat from other
Southeast Asian programs. It was not intended as a population redistribution
measure, but was essentially aimed at improving the socioeconomic status of
the participants. Nor was it implemented as part of a more comprehensive
rural reform. The program schemes generally used land for growing cash
crops, especially rubber and palm oil, rather than subsistence food crops. The
manner of implementation also differed somewhat from other programs.
The Malaysian settlers Wfxe not required to engag"e in jungle clearing, thus
making the projects relatively more capital intensive.

TRANSFER OF LAND OWNERSIDP AND DEVELOPMENT
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The land ownership in Malaysia was under the ruler-in-council, and any

issue of land titles for such lands had to be conducted through the ruler.
However, demand for land was very great on its Moxeman Height. At the
time of independence, August 1957, there were some 200,000 land
applications awaiting action.
A Committee was set up by the government for action. Action included
processing land transfers and making recommendations for improvements
and developments. The Committee report observed that the scheme of land
transfer in Malaysia was commonly causing much work, confusion, taking a
great deal of time, costing a lot of money and producing the poorest economic
results for the individuals concerned and for the community as a whole. One
of the causes of this situation was the initiation of land applications by
individuals rather than by organizations or agencies that could be expected to
have a better understanding or to have an overall view of the selected area.
Almost every application was made for personal gain, without the least
regard for public interest. Under these conditions, applicants who had money
and knowledge about application procedures were in a more favorable
position to obtain land than those who really needed it.
Under the system, land development initiated by the applicants and not
by the administration was not the action desired by the Committee. The
Committee was of the opinion that land ownership transfer should be
initiated by the State to avoid haphazard settlement. It was recommended
that areas of land suitable for development should be identified and an initial
appraisal of the area for its economic viability made before dividing it into
suitable units. It was also thought that in appraising each parcel of land
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before receiving any application, it would be proper to include provision of
basic amenities such as roads, schools, health services, water and other
facilities. An approach of this kind indicated a system of planned settlements.
The Malaysian government set up a working party early in 1955. The
working party emphasized the need for land resources to be assessed. Large
areas for new development would be allocated only after being planned. The
working party recommended an emphasis on the need for planned and
coordinated development of land to insure that economic development
proceeded in accordance to social development goals. The working party also
suggested that development activities be coordinated and controlled to insure
that division of holding does not occur, and that the settlers have an adequate
amount of land and a good standard of living.
The Committee members also recommended that an organization be
created to implement the development program. They suggested that a
federal authority with powers of financing and carrying out individual
projects would be too remote from the state and the people who were to be
assisted. It therefore suggested that the organization for providing federal
assistance for land development schemes be decentralized Local
development authorities, set up by the ruler-in-council for each project,
would be responsible for the planning and execution of the projects. The
Federal Land Development Authority was to be involved only when a local
authority had decided to carry out a project.
Such a system had some weaknesses, for example, too slow a pace in
opening new projects during the initial period. In view of the slow pace and
limited achievements by the Federal Land Development Authority, the
Malaysian government set up a committee in 1960 to investigate the reason
for the lack of success and to review the role of the Federal Land
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Development Authority. The committee gave some reasons for the limited
success:
1

The lack of a sense of urgency in land development matters on the

part of several state governments and their consequent slow response in
proposing schemes.
2. The lack of basic land use surveys and consequent absence of plans for
land development.
3. The lack of access to potential development areas.
4. A shortage of qualified and experienced staff to supervise and manage

land development schemes. (Tunku Shansul Bahrin 1968, 1977).
The committee felt that to meet the increased demand for the proposed land
development fifteen different agencies for land development projects,
including Federal Land Development Authority, which was the largest, had
to be employed.
It is essential to understand fully the process of land settlement in

Malaysia. It is essential to discuss the other types of land development
schemes planned and implemented during the 1960's, namely, the group
land settlement and the fringe land ownerships.

GROUPSETILEMENTSCHEMES

The group settlements were small sized settlements financed and
implemented by the state governments. They came into being with the
implementation of the Settlement Acts of 1961.
The group settlement had some flaws. First, the settlements were in
remote locations because it was hard to find a 2000-hectare area near towns
and villages. Second, there were no subsistence allowances. The settlers were

forced to find alternative sources of income outside the settlements. As a
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result, the settlers were unable to carry out full-time work on their holdings.
Third, because of the shortage of housing facilities, the settlers tended to live
on their holdings rather than in the prescribed village area. This made it
difficult for supervision. Finally, the area held by each settler was too large
for the average family to develop, and the tasks became more difficult
without any financial assistance from the state. Because of all these
difficulties and weaknesses, all states quickly abandoned group settlement
projects.

FRINGE SCHEMES

Fringe schemes were implemented by the state governments but
financed by federal grants and loans. The idea behind these projects was to
supplement existing holdings that were economically unsound. They were
therefore established near agricultural settlements.
The fringe schemes intended that the participants were to be farmers
who already owned holdings that were not economically profitable. Those
holdings considered uneconomic were ones less than 3.6 hectares in area. As
the projects were for people already in possession of some agricultural land,
they were expected to work on the projects on a part-time basis while
continuing to farm their own holdings. The Malaysian government decided
to allocate 49,560,000 (M$) as a federal subsidy for the establishment of such
projects for the period 1960-70. The money was to be provided in the form of
loans and grants to cover the costs of clearing land. The loans were not to
exceed (M$) 815 per hectare to meet the cost of specified items, and interest
was to be charged at a rate not exceeding So/o per year, over a period of six

years. In addition to the loan, a grant was to be made by the federal
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government of about (M$) 647 per hectare to cover the costs of material and
fertilizers.
By the end of 1970,423 projects had been established, covering an area of
64,660 hectares with 26,104 participating families (Tunku Bahrin 1976). The
overall performance of these projects can be generally described as
disappointing. The federal government was so dissatisfied with the projects
that it had to create a new federal authority (the Federal Land Consolidation
and Rehabilitation Authority), with the major function of helping and
redeveloping those failed projects.

IMPLEMENTATION AND SETILER SELECTION

Since 1950 the government had been aware that settlers were the most
important factor in implementation and determining the success or failure of
its programs. The Federal Land Development Authority tried a number of
selection systems to insure that it obtained the right type of settlers. For 28
years the Authority has instituted a number of changes in its selection system,
however, according to its formalized selection system, prospective
participants had to submit their applications on prescribed forms and meet
these requirements:
1. Malaysian citizens;
2. Aged 21-50 years;
3. Married, preferably with children;
4. Landless or with rural holding of less than 0.8 hectares;
5. From an agricultural background, and;
6. Physically fit.
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Applicants who met the requirements were first interviewed, then accepted
on a points system. The most points were awarded to those who were
landless, with large numbers of dependents. The maximum score was 100,
and any applicant obtaining a score of less than 50 points was disqualified.

Development of Land
Malaysia had considerable land available for development, but the
choices of land for settlement was not simple and easy. Almost all land that
was suitable for agricultural development and in close proximity to
transportation and other communication had already been utilized. The state
governments owned most unoccupied land. The Federal Land Development
Authority had to negotiate with state governments to secure release of any
land for settlement. When agreement had been reached with respect to
location, suitable crops, and survey fees, the state government declared the
land a development area. Once declared a development area, the land was
then turned to the Federal Land Development Authority. Most settlement
sizes per project were 1800 hectares for 400 families. The size of holding per
settler family on the other hand was governed by income and employment
factors. Each settler family was given 4 hectares of agricultural land and a
piece of residential lot about 0.1 hectares in size.

Pattern of Settlement Development
The pattern of pre-1966 development under the Federal Land
Development Authority scheme for settler families occurred in different
phases. The first year was devoted to the felling and clearing of trees for the
establishment of an approximate 300 acre (120 hectare) village area and the
planting of about 1000 acres (400 hectares) of the main crop. Land remaining
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for the main crop was developed in subsequent annual stages of
approximately 1000 to 1500 acres (400-600 hectares). The subsidiary crop areas
were developed at a later period, as decided by the Federal Land Development
Authority, subject to the progress made in the development of land for the
main crop. This pattern was known as phased development. Since 1966, this
pattern has changed over to the development of larger areas.
The government's desire to speed land development made it imperative
that larger areas for agricultural development be made available. The
emphasis on palm oil also made the development of larger areas desirable in
order to realize the economic benefits of such scale. In the past, logging delays
had prevented the land from becoming rapidly available. But increasing
demand for tropical timbers and increased logging and clearing rates made it
easier to obtain larger areas. With an increase in management, it was possible
to develop larger areas.

LAND DEVELOPMENT ACHIEVEMENTS

The Federal Land Development Authority in Malaysia was considered
the most important agency in the field of land settlement. This was clearly
recognized by the government, as seen by the land allotted for development.
By the end of 1982, the agency had implemented 331 projects comprising a
total of 1,383,528 acres (559,906 hectares) of agricultural land and 93,527 acres
(37,850 hectares) of urban and residential land. Palm oil and rubber were the
major crops, occupying some 60.6 and 29.3 percent of the total agricultural
area, respectively.
The Federal Land Development Authority made a number of significant
contributions to the development and diversification of agriculture in

Malaysia. The area developed and maintained by the agency made up 12
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percent of Malaysia's cultivated land. Although it helped to create
communities and prosperous small scale rubber producers, the expansion in
the cultivation of palm oil is considered one of the Authority's greatest
contributions. By the end of 1982, the agency had relocated 43,978 settlers on
its palm oil projects, producing 4,734,605 tons of palm oil, representing about
30 percent of Malaysia's total production. This most significant contribution
successfully showed that traditional farmers could be turned into modern
agriculturalists if given the right guidance and opportunities (Chan

1983).

CONCLUSION

Malaysia developed a satisfactory land settlement program. During the
30 years since its inception in the mid-1950's, the settlement program became
a significant tool for the economic development of Malaysia. In addition, the
programs attracted a great deal of attention from many countries who were
involved in similar programs. This does not mean that their program was
perfect or solved all the difficulties of the rural areas of the country. The
Federal Land Development Authority by the end of 1982 had been able to
resettle only about 76,782 families and develop 599,900 hectares; many more
applications were waiting to be processed and new demands and challenges
emerged, awaiting solutions.
Overall, it would be reasonable to conclude that the land development
program in Malaysia, as planned and implemented, achieved the objectives
formulated in the mid-1950's. It can be said that the achievements were
beyond expectation.
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CHAPTER IX

LAND SETILEMENTS IN THE PI-ITLIPPINES

The Philippines have experienced extended periods of resettlement,
almost more than any other country in Southeast Asia, including both
government sponsored and spontaneous settlements. However, the
resettlement schemes in the Philippines may be reviewed in three stages: the
colonial period of Spanish rule, which developed a tradition of agricultural
production oriented toward export crops; second, an American colonial
period; and third, a period of settlement during the independence period
(1946-60) (Paderanga and Pemia 1983).

SETILEMENT POLICY IDSTORY

The American policy during the colonial period had three major goals.
First, integrate the Philippine economy into the U.S. market. That was done
by lowering the barriers to trade between the two countries. The second aim
was an attempt to rationalize land ownership. The mixture of the remnants
of the Spanish system with a different method of land management and
registration under the United States led to friction between landowners and
tenants, which caused conflicting claims to ownership of land. The United
States issued new laws regulating the possession and ownership of land.
These laws provided for the disposition of public land and introduced the
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homestead concept. The third objective of the U.S. government was a
conciliatory policy toward and amalgamation of the non-Christian
population, especially in the south. This approach was pursued to encourage
people from the north and central parts to settle in the frontier regions.
Direct government involvement in settlement programs started when it
adopted a policy of actively encouraging migration in 1913. It established
agricultural settlements that offered free transportation and financial
assistance. From 1913 to 1917, nine such settlements were established,
covering in area about 12,760 hectares. Government policy makers sought to
encourage homesteaders to migrate from congested areas into the interior
and southern parts of the Mindonao area. They hoped it would lead to
integration and Pilippinization of different ethnic groups in these areas.
These settlements were in general unsuccessful, because of a lack of funds, illchosen sites, and unwise selections of settlers.
In 1917, the government, discouraged by the high costs and lack of

success, retreated from its policy of sponsored settlements. The program was
replaced by one that merely encouraged the movement of migrants who
could support themselves for at least six months in the settlement area.
Apart from transportation and guidance regarding the final destination, no
support was offered. Up to 1935 the quantitative impact of these early
programs was very small (SimKins and Wernstadt 1968).
The period of 1935 to 1946 was one in which the established
Commonwealth government maintained the policy of encouraging
settlements in thinly populated areas. Because of past mistakes, they
concentrated on building up infrastructural support in the target areas, such
as the frontier regions. Funds originally allotted for direct expenditure on
agricultural settlements were diverted to road construction and land survey.

In the same time period, the government passed the Commonwealth Act,
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which established the National Land Settlement Administration (NLSA).
Under the NLSA many families moved to settlement areas at their own
expense. The administration found it was difficult to tum back these
families, which led to a rapid growth of population in the southern frontier,
especially in Mindanao.
The third period of settlement, during the independence, exhibited a
different set of priorities (Pelzer 1946). Whereas colonial policy dictated close
integration between the Filipino government and the United States, political
autonomy in the Philippines decreed the economy of the country should
stand on its own as much as possible. For the Philippines, this implied that a
larger proportion of the industrial products it consumed would have to be
generated from within. The unifying aim was industrialization, with import
substitution as the main strategy to be followed. The policies used to
implement this strategy were exchange and import controls. Rather than
adjusting the overvalued peso, policy makers regarded it as an instrument to
direct capital funds to preferred industries at subsidized rates. To maintain
the official rate, the use of foreign exchange had to be controlled and a system
of priorities instituted. Import substitution industries such as textile and
appliance manufacturing were favored.
Tax incentives and a comprehensive restructuring of tariffs were also
used to achieve the overall objective. The final policy of the period was to
raise the minimum wage; its unintended result was to discourage laborintensive industries and further bias investment toward capital-intensive
import substitution industries. It was very sad that among these policies was
a very strong disincentive to the agricultural sector. The overvalued peso,
together with the bias of foreign exchange and controls toward import
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substitution, effectively penalized the export-oriented agricultural cash crops

on which the growth of the agricultural sector had been based before
independence. At the same time, the ability of the agricultural sector to shift
forcefully to the production of food for the domestic market was effectively
blocked by the bias against the sector contained in the selective credit
instruments, and the policy of subsidized importation of some commodities
including food products, aimed at lowering food prices in the urban centers.
Biased production techniques hardly changed for many years. Until 1960
almost all agricultural growth came not from increased productivity but from
increases in the area of the land under cultivation. Such increase was
possible only because of the intensification of frontier region settlement.
World War IT interrupted the settlem,ent activities of the government, but
they resumed soon after, especially in the frontier area, when the applications
increased sharply immediately after liberation as new migrants squatted on
former Japanese plantations. In 1971 the Law of Agrarian Land Reform Code
was amended, outlawing share tenancies and regulating land ownership and
agrarian relations. This law created the land resettlement program as part of
the general program of land reform (Renaud 1981). In 1983, the Bureau of
Resettlement of the Ministry of Agrarian Reform had been able to develop
about 736,969 hectares of land and resettle 52,728 families.

CONCLUSIONS AND POLICY IMPLICATIONS

The major conclusion obtained from the Philippine experience was that
a land settlement program alone cannot solve social and economic problems.
The program of settlement was successful in population redistribution and
growth of agricultural output, but failed in one important objective, the

pacification of cultural minorities. Finally, the most important lesson to be
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learned from this analysis, which is indirectly related to land settlement
schemes: a significant cause of the problems that land settlement programs
were called to address were the broad macroeconomic and trade policies that
had tremendous impact on the demographic configuration of the Philippines.
These same policies also tended to negate the long-term benefits that could be
expected from the various settlement projects. Unless changes are made in
these more fundamental policies, the ultimate benefits from land settlements
will be very small or negligible.

CHAPTER X

SETTLEMENTS IN ISRAEL

Israel is considered a pioneer state with large and extensive experience in
land settlement planning and implementation. As mentioned in the
introduction, land settlements continue to be a high priority in many
countries to utilize uncultivated and sparsely populated areas as part of rural
development. The discussion here involves case studies of two settlements
in Israel which had unique conditions pertaining to type of land use,
initiative, institutional characteristics of the promoting agency, and
orientation for good self-management. The study was done by Yair Levi
(senior researcher at the settlement study center, Rohovot, Israel) and Gedalia
Naveh (senior research associate at Columbia University in New York, 1983).
The study was conducted to find settlements that had differed
significantly from each other in their development, mainly with respect to
two important aspects: first, the delegating of the authority from an external
team of change agents to the settlers; and second, economic consolidation.
The two settlements that met these requirements were also found to share a
number of features, such as the settlers' country of origin, the arrival time in
Israel and to the settlement, the type of farm, the allocation of production and
the kind of assistance provided by the settling agency. These two settlements
were selected from a total of 31 Moshvei ovdim (small holder cooperative
settlement) in Israel.

OTZEM SETTLEMENT
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Located close to the northern line of Lakhish region and about halfway
between Ashkelon and the town of Kiryat Gat, this settlement was one of the
14 settlements that make up the Lakhish regional council and one of the five
Moshvei olim (immigrant moshav) served by the Nehora rural center, where
the offices of the regional council were located.
OTZEM was the first settlement established under the program of
regional settlement based on the composite rural structure. Of the settlers at
OTZEM, all of the 60 settlers' families came to Israel in May 1955 from the
Atlas mountains of Morocco. They were from the same community and
ethnically very homogeneous. This initial homogeneity was an important
factor in understanding the settlement development. The background of the
settlers was characterized by traits which were at odds with those required for
optimal socialization to moshove life and the overall absorption into Israel
society.
On the arrival of the settlers at the OTZEM settlement, they found small
houses available for temporary accommodation, as well as small village
facilities such as an office, a dispensary, a food store and a few classrooms, as
well as the synagogue and Mikve (a ritual bath used by religious Jews). The
settlement instructors, who were mostly volunteers from a veteran kibbutz,
were already at the settlement. In comparison with the new immigrants
from Morocco, the external change agents displayed different ethnic cultural
traits; however, this seems to have been compensated for by their devotion
and commitment. Sharing with the settlers their way of life was an essential
part of their role and a source of pride for them.
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Type of Farming on the Settlement
Field crops were the basis for the farm type established for the OTZEM
settlement and its surrounding villages was established on field crops. Crops
included sugar beets, cotton, groundnuts, vegetable crops, and fruit orchards.
Citrus, peach and apples orchards were established on a collective plot.

Land Allocation
Each of the 86 settlers received about 37 dunans* in addition to their
share in the collective plot of about 3,000 dunans. Vegetables were grown at
first on the 3 dunans adjacent to the house and then increasingly on the
larger plots (about 10-20 dunans).

The Settlers' Income
The average farm income rose from IL600 in the first year (1955-1956) to
IL500,100 in 1964-1965. Total average annual net income rose from IL1,600 to
IL5,100, and administered wages for farm and relief workers diminished from
IL1,000 to IL100 in 1959-1960 (reported by Yaia Levi & Gedalia Noveh).
Within nine years of the settlement's inception, the settlers had become
responsible and hard-working. They came to be considered .the vegetable
suppliers of the area. They had gradually progressed along the steps set forth
by the planning, namely, the termination of salaried labor in the
administered farm; the shift from vegetable cultivation on the plot adjacent
to the house to a combination of vegetable and other crops; taking over some
of the local function tasks through the election of a village committee; and
withdrawal of the external advisory team. Up until 1968, the OTZEM
settlement was registered as a cooperative, and was the last among the

* Each dunan equals 250 meters; or 10 dunans equals 1 hectare.
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immigrant moshovim in the Lakhish region to achieving legal
incorporation.
The withdrawal of the extemal advisory team and the regionalization of
most of its functions prevented prolonged guidance The planners were
served by having the village play an increasingly important role in the
development of the area. However, this left OTZEM settlement insufficiently
able to cope with two important factors: first, the challenge of new
agricultural technologies, and second,** the exposure to over dependence on
regional purchasing organizations.
In 1974 a plan for economic development was drawn up to diversify the

farm structure of the settlement. The plan failed to generate a better local
leadership or train people to be capable of coping with the requirements of
more sophisticated credit and marketing operations. Farm specialization led
to the formation of new pressure groups and disrupted the old homogeneity
in the production. In the absence of adequate assistance and follow-up, the
settlement was ill-prepared when it entered the areas of turkey and flower
production, and consequently soon became overly dependent on the regional
purchasing organization. This proved advantageous for a few of the most
enterprising members and generated distrust in the village committee.
The settling authority of Israel set Aprill, 1979 as the date for formal
consolidation of OTZEM settlement. The phase of formal consolidation, a
crucial one in the strategies of guided farm settlement, implied that an
assessment be done of investments still to be made, in production factors for
each holding according to the farm type, and taking into consideration
investments already made. The date was to serve as a baseline estimating the
value of the investment. On the signing of the consolidation contract, the

**

1 US$= ll.. 1-8.

90
settlers were considered sufficiently mature to make the best use of the
investment and capable of refunding the loans on a long-term basis with easy
rates of interest.
For the OTZEM settlement, the consolidation process of 1979 should
have served as a continuation of the 1974 pre-consolidation; however, many
elements contributed to a wide gap between the plan's intention and its
implementation. The importance the gap was that it challenged the
expectations of the average settler. Given inadequate information and
preparation, he could have no clear idea of the criteria concerning the
evaluation of his economic situation and the determination of investments.
The settlers' attitudes were of anticipated well-being and economic strength,
with little if any regard to the

commi~ent

expected of him. Such a situation

was encouraged by the failure of the management committee to exercise
effective social control.

Participation in Production
According to Moshav secretary estimates, only 12-15 settlers out of a total
of 86 were fully engaged in farming. These were producers of vegetables for
processing plants and export. Another 25-30 worked in agriculture either
fully or on a part-time basis, mainly in fruit and vegetable production. More
than half of the adult male population of the settlement were in
nonagricultural employment or were unemployed on account of age, illness
or even refusal to work, as in the case of many of the youth.
In the summer of 1982, the overall debt of the OTZEM settlement was

about IL530 million,t and originated in part from losses in floriculture. Of a
maximum of 15 producers of flowers in 1978-1979, four remained in 1982.
t 1527- US $1. (Cited by Jewish agency 1981) (?)
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A number of major externalities at the macro level lay under the overall

crisis that afflicted the Israeli agricultural sector in the early 1980s. Included
were diminishing returns on agricultural products due to international
competition, and the change in Israeli development policies.
The capability of OTZEM settlement to rehabilitate itself through this or
other programs depends largely on its ability, under proper guidance, to
exploit its young labor potential, previously largely underutilized.

Demography
The OTZEM settlement was considered the third largest settlement of
the Lakhish region, population 592. The average family size was 6-9 persons,
the age group 15-29 made up 44.1 percent of the total male population. Of the
89 men comprising the 18-24 age group, 50 (56.2o/o) were working outside their
family farm, and 14 (15.7%) were neither working or studying.

NOAM SETTLEMENT

The settlement is located on Beersheba Road and Even Shmuel. Noam
is part of the Shafir Regional Council and is the regional housing center. It is
about 3 km south of Kiryat Gat, a rural town of the Lakhish region, which
offers a variety of commercial facilities. Kiryat Gat houses the regional
organization, which provides the Noam settlement with accountancy
services.

Size of the Settlement
Noam is smaller than OTZEM in both size and population. Its total area
is 5,095 dunams, of which 2,859 are under irrigated agriculture and 2,236 are
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under the local cooperative as a single unit consisting of irrigated citrus trees
(400 dunams) and rain fed cereal crops (1,848 dunams). The population

between 1979-1980 was 503 people. Each of the 83 households had an average
of 34.4 dunans.

Noam Settlers
All of the settlers of the settlement came from a common Moroccan
origin. Despite their commonality, they displayed great heterogeneity in
ethnic characteristics. There were three groups that came to the settlement.
The first, 33 families of urban origin, arrived in August 1955. The second, 11
families from the Ta'anach Moshav settlement area in northern Israel,
arrived in November 1955. From a small township in the Marakesh area, the
third group, 12 families, arrived in April 1957. Such a mix led in time to
repeated conflicts and an intricate web of alliances.
Because the internal unrest encouraged high turnover of external
instructors, the department of community works introduced new modes of
intervention for achieving the desired organizational outcome of the
settlement. Such heterogeneity of background served as a stimulus to
intergroup competition on the whole. The planned stage of salaried labor as a
preparation towards the allocation of plots achieved the objective of the
planners, in that it gave way to a gradual shift in the settlers from salaried
worker to farm operator.

Type of Settlement Production

In the beginning, cotton, sugar beets and vegetables formed the entire
production activity in the settlement. From 1968 on, turkey and dairy
farming were gradually introduced. By 1970 there were 31 dairy farmers and 9

turkey farmers, from a total of 47 households. The introduction of dairy

93

production was done with the purpose of more diversified farm types.
The dairy production, however, did not come up to expectations, and by
the end of 1974, only three of the dairy farms were still in operation. Sugar
beets declined until their cultivation was discontinued in 1971. The returns
from cooperative marketing of vegetables from 36 settlers declined by 94
percent. However, vegetable production for private markets continued, with
smaller quantities and on less land. At the same time, new employment
opportunities began to emerge in nearby places. These trends led to the
liquidation of the dairy herds and shifts to turkey production as the most
attractive product.
In 1980 the land settlement department declared Noam settlement ready

for economic consolidation. The regional purchasing organization, which
invested large sums of money in the construction of cow barns and turkey
houses, started exerting pressure to bring about its implementation, as it had
an interest in regaining its past investment in the financial allocations from
the land settlement department.
The move toward economic consolidation met with strong opposition
from the settlers. Many of the settlers saw non-cooperative marketing as a
means of avoiding the control exerted by the regional purchasing
organization on their defaulting accounts. The consolidation process was
ignored by the settlers. The consequential struggle and the repeated impaired
management led to an election five years later in 1976.

In 1981, the Noam settlement moved toward self-management. The
long experience enabled the settlers to evaluate their past history with a new
awareness of their potential. They learned that internal discord serves the
establishment more than their own interests. During the 1981 political

elections, the people of Noam settlement took revenge on their party by
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denying it their vote. Even so, they still felt heavily dependent on their party,
particularly on the economic benefit afforded by the regional purchasing
organization as well as welfare services.

FROM ADMINISTERED TO SELF-MANAGED COMMUNffiES:
THE MODEL IN THE LAKHISH EXPERIENCE

The methods of settlement in Moshavi Olim and their management
underwent a number of changes as a result of the experience gained during
the establishment of settlement activities and supervision over them. At the
beginning of mass settlement, in the years 1949-1952, no definite model was
set for managing rural settlements. Ad hoc solutions were improvised by
those responsible for the establishment and promotion of settlements. Only
at a later stage, between 1954 and 1956, were organizational and
administrative tools formulated which determined the administration of
settlements. Studies and surveys conducted after that time revealed that the
new methods were more adequate than the earlier ones, and allowed a
speedier transition from administered communities to self-managed ones.
These methods evolved mainly during the settlement of the Lachish region
in the years 1955-1956. In the course of the settlement project, quite a few new
Moshavin were established and occupied mainly with new immigrants from
Africa and Asia, who came to Israel shortly before they settled in the Moshav
and in most cases were brought to the Moshav directly upon arrival in Israel.
The administration methods applied in the Lakhish region were based
on a number of stages which are described in the following. These together
with a few other measures will be discussed later, enabled settlements to
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reach a certain degree of self-management within a shorter period of time
than those that were established earlier and were not administered according
to the new principles.

Selection of Settlers
The selection of settlers was minimal, and was based essentially on the
age of the family in order to avoid settlement of older families who would be
unable to work on the farm. The selected candidates were mostly young and
middle-aged heads of families. Factors such as the health of family members,
level of education, or professional training were not consider during
selection. The lack of rigid selection led to the amassing of a large number of
unsuitable settlers who could not adjust to rural life, and who finally had to
leave the Moshav. The phenomenon of departure was therefore widespread
in Moshavi Olim. There are no accurate data on the number of families that
left, but estimates by the settlement department claim that of those referred to
rural settlements between 1949-1954, about 30 percent either left or were
expelled, whereas in 1955-1956, the figure dropped to about 16 percent, which
was attributed to improvement in the selection process.

The External Supporting Team
In general, the new settlements were established as Moshavin. Village

institutions never functioned as they should. No village committee was
elected, and even when a committee of any village existed, it was ineffective.
The daily administration and key positions were operated by the settlement
department.
The outside people who lived in the village varied from settlement to
settlement, but on the average, it included three instructors and two or three
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functionaries. The accepted models included a general instructor, extension
worker, and home economics instructor
The job of the general instructor was to manage the village. He
represented the Moshav in its relations with regional or national agencies,
such as marketing and purchasing organizations, ministries and so on. He
was in charge of interpreting the various development plans designed by the
settlement department and explaining the basic principles of the Moshav to
the settlers, and organizing elections to local institutions of the Moshov in
order to gradually lead the settlers toward self-management. The instructor
would operate primarily by serving as an advisor to the elected functionaries
in key positions. The ability of the instructor to gain the confidence of settlers
in general, and of the elected leadership in particular, played an important
role in determining his success. The general instructor functioned as the
channel for development between the settlement department and the
Moshav; he therefore participated, together with his superiors in the
settlement department, in the preparation of the annual budget. In the end,
as long as the villagers were unable to manage the responsibility of
administering their Moshav, the general instructor was the central
organizing and managing figure in the village.
The main function of the extension worker, as any agricultural
extension worker, was dispersing agricultural guidance to every settler in the
settlement. Usually he was a graduate of agricultural school or an
experienced farmer from a veteran agricultural settlement. He followed
recommendations and directives formulated by regional branch experts. He
was like the general instructor in that he operated in a way to enable settlers
to gradually assume self-management of their own plots.

The job of the home economics instructor included guiding the entire
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family, the housewife in particular, in the organization of the household,
including budgeting of family expenses, setting up priorities for family
consumer needs and advising on home maintenance. The home economics
instructor played an important role for immigrants who located in the new
settlements.
All three instructors were employees of the settlement department. In
addition to the three major instructors, the external supporting team
generally included two or three other workers. A kindergarten teacher, a
nurse, and the local grocery manager. The kindergarten teacher was
appointed and paid by the Ministry of Education, and the nurse was employed
by Kupat Holim (the national health insurance organization). In some cases,
the manager of the local grocery store was a private individual. Yet in most
cases, the manager was a representative of the cooperative society that
managed such groceries in Moshvi Olim.
The team's work in the Moshav was supervised by regional officers
appointed for each of the regional units. The activities of the general
instructor and home economics instructor were supervised mostly by the
officers of the settlement, who were formally employees of its settlement
department. Their role was to advise the instructors and to serve as
intermediaries between them and the regional office of the settlement
department. The extension workers on the other hand, were chosen and
appointed by the department, and were in direct contact with the regional
branch experts.
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STAGES IN THE TRANSITION FROM ADMINISTERED TO SELFMANAGED COMMUNITY

The settlement department defined a number of stages in the
development of settlements toward self-management, which have been
applied ever since the implementation of Lakhish project in 1955.
The stages represent a gradual process, both with regard to the
agricultural training of settlers and in relation to management aspects,
leading to self-administration of the settlement and proper functioning of the
village institution and committees. This approach allowed the settlement
department to spread the allocation of means of production over an extended
period of time. The stages were not laid down as official regulations or
procedures and therefore differed in each case. In general, the process was
divided into three distinguishable stages: a stage of administration by
external agencies; a stage of transition; and a stage of consolidation and
weaning.

Stage of Administration of External Agencies
This stage usually lasted for three years following the establishment of
the settlement. During this period, the agricultural branches were managed
as an administered farm, and the various institutions were run by teams of
instructors. In the first year the farmer did not receive any land for
individual farming. In order to start the agricultural enterprise, a public
company was founded by the settlement department affiliated with the
Moshav, and all the village lands were handed over to it. The extension
worker, together with a team of supervisors appointed by the public company,
organized the work schedule, and the settlers worked as hired laborers and

received a daily wage. This system allowed settlers to start working in
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agriculture without taking on themselves the risk attendant upon
inexperience, their own or that of the settlement department, and without
having to worry about the management of the farm.
During the first year only a relatively small part of the land earmarked
for cultivation was actually tilled. The figures are different from one
settlement to the other, but on the average about 10-20 percent of all the land
allocated to a settlement was planted. The second year the settler was
allocated an individual plot near his house, while the rest of the land was
cultivated as before.
The third year, the area cultivated as one lot was much reduced, and the
plots allocated to individuals for cultivation were extended, in most cases
administered. Cultivation was terminated by the end of the third year, and
areas were then allocated to the individual settlers.

Stage of Transition
The duration of transition varied in different settlements but usually
lasted longer than the originally predicted period of 7-8 years set by the
planners Settlements established in the Lakhish region in 1955 were
supposed to undergo a transition stage lasting 5-6 years. In fact, this stage
usually lasted for 10-12 years, but in some cases settlements were still at the
stage of transition 25 years since their establishment. The reasons for this
situation were mostly the lack of the necessary funds from the settlement
department to accomplish the process.

Stage of Consolidation and Weaning
The consolidation stage of a settlement was reached when the settlement
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department, the settlement movements, and the settlers themselves all
agreed that the settlement was ready to become independent of the regular
care of the department. Once the decision was reached, the settlement
department and the Moshav sign a consolidation contract. This contract,
which is later also signed with every member of the Moshav, lists all the
property, the equipment and means of production provided by the settlement
department over the years, and states the terms for repayment of the loan.
Thus upon entering the consolidation stage, each settler is to pay back the
loan he received according to the defined conditions. The stage of
consolidation and weaning usually lasted about three years.
The first group of 110 settlements from 300 Moshavim established
between 1948-1960 reached the stage of consolidation in 1966. At the
beginning of 1981, over 200 settlements reached the consolidation stage.
Some 100 settlements still remained at the second stage 25 years since their
establishment (Rokach 1988).

CONCLUSION

The stages of development and the management methods in the
Moshavim that were established in Israel during the 1950s constituted a
typical example of the weaning process in cooperative rural villages found in
administered communities. Weaning was achieved by joint effort of several
agencies and organizations, the settlement department of the Jewish agency,
settlement movements, and regional organizations such as the regional
purchasing organization and the regional councils. Without the integrated
activity of all the organizations involved, the weaning process would
probably have been longer and more difficult.

CHAPTER XI

LAND SETTLEMENTS IN INDONESIA

Land settlements in Indonesia differ from the examples previously
mentioned in this dissertation. Indonesian land settlements were
implemented as a means to alleviate the population pressures existing on the
island of Java. The directed movement of people from the island of Java to
the outer islands of Indonesia proved to be one of the largest such
movements in the world.
The movement of Indonesian people from Java to less populated islands
dates back to the turn of the 20th century. The policy established to
commence this movement was known as transmigration. At the turn of the
century, Java's population accounted for nearly 80% of the Indonesia's total
population. The tremendous population located in Java and corresponding
evidence of declining rural social and economic welfare were two major
contributing factors to the establishment of the transmigration policy.

IDSTORY OF TRANSMIGRATION POLICY

The transmigration or settlements established by the government acted
as nucleated communities and attracted unsponsored migration. The
ultimate goal in transmigration was to set up a flow of spontaneous migrants
who would move from overcrowded areas without government assistance.
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Such migration occurred on a large scale, especially in the provinces closet to
Java. Spontaneous migration reinforced the official transmigration program,
achieving its purposes at relatively little cost to the government.
Spontaneous migration accelerated the growth of settler communities
and provided additional labor forces for clearing, planting, and other
agricultural works. A few independent settlers arrived at the new
communities from Java and Bali. During the 1970s the migration continued
entirely independent of government support. The introduction of new,
rapidly maturing varieties of rice, which produced three crops a year,
produced higher incomes but also labor shortages. The higher incomes and
labor shortages contributed to attract increasing numbers of not just farmers
or farm laborers, but school teachers, shopkeepers, craftsmen, and others who
found their services in demand. As economic growth throughout the nation
increased during the 1970s there was a reverse flow of people from the outer
islands to Java. Java was the center of the nation's new found growth in the
1970s and as such proved to be a substantial attractor of outer island settlers
who were motivated by the employment opportunities and other benefits of
city life.
To encourage the movement of people from Java to the outer islands,
primarily Sumatra, the Indonesian government provided migrant families
with free transportation and access to arable land which could be purchased
using government loans. Government loans were also made available for
building materials, tools and seeds. In Lampung, the province of Sumatra
closest to Java, substantial investment in irrigation was made by the
Indonesian government.
Between 1905 and 1922, nearly 22,000 people were moved to settlements
in the southern Sumatra provinces of Lampung and Benghulu. In the 1920's
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the transmigration stopped, although there was some spontaneous migration
to the Lampung settlements. In 1932 the colonial government of the
Netherlands decided to resume transmigration. The needs of established
settlers for harvest labor were met by bringing migrants to work for one
season before becoming settlers themselves in new villages. By 1940 some
200,000 government sponsored migrants had settled in new villages under
the Netherlands migration policy. During the 1930s a large spontaneous flow
of migrant labor moved into the Sumatran plantations. In 1942 with the
Japanese occupation, settlements came to an end.
For nearly fifteen years following World Warn the Indonesian economy
was racked by civil war and political instability. The Indonesian population
continued to grow and manifest in congestion and poverty throughout Java
and Bali. It was estimated that two-thirds of the nation's population lived
below the poverty line. By 1966 economic development was given priority.
The oil boom of the early 1970s provided Indonesia with resources for rapid
economic growth.

RENEWED INTEREST IN TRANSMIGRATION

By the 1970s the change in government had restimulated interest in
transmigration. Realizing that transmigration could not solve the problem of
population imbalance, the government came to view it as a policy with a
welfare objective. The objective was to raise the living standards of migrants
as well as the standards of villages in Java. It was hoped that transmigration
could serve as regional economic development on the outer islands.
During the 1973-74 and 1979-80 OPEC oil price increases, foreign
exchange earnings were introduced to Indonesia. Large revenues went to the
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government which in turn identified development targets throughout the
country. The transmigration policy became a main beneficiary. Both the scale
of the transmigration program and its regional development objectives
became more ambitious. The income of migrant settlers was raised by giving
them enough land to grow cash crops as well as food for their own needs.
Special emphasis was placed on tree crops such as rubber and oil palm.
Transmigration was accelerated to settlements that would benefit from
the development of new infrastructure and community facilities such as
schools, clinics, and water. The land settlements were to serve as growth
centers by attracting spontaneous migrants from populated areas like Java.
The land settlements would also serve to promote regional development
beyond agriculture by diversifying to processing and manufacturing, as well
as trade and services.
Major components of the transmigration and settlement policy included
(1) selection of transmigrants; (2) selection of settlement sites; (3) land
preparation; (4) migrant assistance; and (5) regional development.

Selection of Transmigrants
The selection of migrants involved three principles. Participation
should be voluntary, only family units should be involved, and priority
given to people from communities affected by natural disasters such as
flooding or volcanic eruptions. The family head had to be 20 to 40 years of age
and married with a family of not more than five members. No member of
the household could be over 60 or under six months of age. Pregnant women
were not allowed to participate with a family during migration. Farming
skills were desirable but not necessary. As the program expanded in the 1970s
officials started to stress the need to include migrants with skills that included
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building and construction
Finally, the migration was voluntary and therefore somewhat selfselective as the potential migrants were showing a willingness to leave their
roots and face the risks of building a new life in unknown environments.

Settlement Site Selection
Selection of sites for transmigration settlements was based on two
criteria; suitability for irrigation and proximity to Java. As the areas in south
Sumatra and Lampung available for rice farming became threatened by
population increases, attention shifted to other parts of the country for
availability of good agricultural land. Much of the land in north Sumatra and
south Sulawesi was already under cultivation. The choices left were between
the relatively poor soils of the rain-fed upland and reclaimable swamp.
After 1966, the swamp reclamation alternative became the choice among
transmigration planner. Nearly 1/4 of the total Indonesian land area
consisted of swamps. The swamp reclamation alternative appeared
appropriate in part because food production was a priority objective and
reclaimed swampland, with its tidal irrigation, was suitable for rice
cultivation.
Swamp reclamation was pioneered in Indonesia by spontaneous
migrants. Swamp reclamation for land settlements were made, under
government auspices before and after World War II. These reclamation
measures attracted few settlers.
With little opportunity for more settlement on irrigated lowlands, and
swamp reclamation lagging, the transmigration program shifted its sights to
locations in the rain-fed upland areas of the outer islands. The upland areas
of the outer islands has some agricultural potential, but the soils were
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naturally low in fertility and highly susceptible to erosion. The upland areas
were more suited to tree planting than crop cultivation.
In 1978, as part of a major reorganization of the transmigration program,

responsibility for selection and evaluation of large sites was assigned to the
Directorate of Regional and City Planning, with assistance from the World
Bank. Soon thereafter, staff resources and appropriate procedures were
developed.
Prior to clearing land, the newly reorganized transmigration program
planned the selection of sites based on regional development criteria such as
proximity to existing or proposed roads and regional growth centers. Sites
were screened using existing data including aerial photography, topographic
mapping, and soil surveys. These materials were analyzed to assess any
potential blocks to accelerated settlement.

Land Preparation
The standard practice during the 1950s and 1960s was to give migrant
families 2 hectares of land. One hectare was cleared by the government before
the migrants arrived, while the other hectare was to be cleared by the settlers
following their arrival. But clearing off the second hectare was not an easy
job to accomplish. It often proved beyond the migrants' capabilities.
Furthermore, the land cleared was only rain-fed which yielded a subsistence
income at best.
In the 1970s, with the assistance of the World Bank, plots of 3.5 - 5.0

hectares were allocated to each transmigrant family. The major portion of
this land, including the 1 hectare cleared by the government, was reserved for
tree crops. The government also assumed responsibility for provision of
settlement infrastructure. In some instances the adequate preparation of sites,
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including soil surveys, clearing of land, construction of roads, and building of
settler homes and community buildings took up to six years.
In 1978, the Directorate General of Transmigration was exclusively
responsible for village planning, land clearing, and construction of houses
and other village infrastructure. In the same year, village planning and land
clearing were transferred to the new Directorate for Land Planning in the
Department of Public Works. The new Directorate sought private contractors
to clear the land. This action stimulated heated debate between the
Indonesian government and the World Bank and affiliated consultants.
Government agencies preferred mechanical clearing as an expedient manner
to keep up with timetables. The World Bank preferred and advised use of
manual techniques for clearing, citing soil conservation concerns and the
prohibitive equipment costs associated with clearing small plots of land.

Migrant Assistance
The key factors to keep migrants in their new settlements was to provide
them with other kinds of assistance besides land and housing. In the 1950s it
was assumed that initial support to settlers such as seed and food allowances
for a few months until the first crop was harvested was sufficient for the
development of a successful settlement. This proved to be unrealistic, either
because the land was not cleared when the settlers arrived or because the first
crops were disappointing due to poor soil, inadequate water, or pests.
In the 1970s, the settlers received assistance during the first 12 month
following their arrival. Under this plan the settlers had time to clear and
cultivate their fields. The standard support consisted of monthly rations of
rice and other household foods. Additionally, they received an initial supply
of farming tools, fertilizer, pesticides, seeds and seedlings, and in some cases a

108

draught animal. Failure to ensure that these essential supplies and services
reached the settlers in a timely and proper manner proved to be a chronic
logistical problem for the program.

One of the most effective forms of assistance to transmigrants was the
promotion of tree crop planting. The World Bank provided financial and
technical assistance in support of tree crop cultivation projects, chiefly rubber
trees. The primary objective was to raise the income of settlers by growing
cash crops instead of food crops.

Regional Development
The contribution of regional development to the nation of Indonesia
resulting from the policy of transmigration in the outer islands of Indonesia,
particularly Sumatra, Kalimantan, and Sulawesi was substantial.
Development of the primarily forested areas prompted movement of nearly 3
million settlers into new village communities and stimulated large scale rice
cultivation. The program of transmigration contributed to the major policy
goal of increased food production, as well as establishing the development of
infrastructure items such as roads, irrigation and swamp reclamation. The
program was also a contributing factor in the promotion of industry and
trade, exploitation and processing of mineral, forest, and other resources. It
also prompted the improvement of transportation and communications
necessary to integrate the country more effectively into the national and
world economy.
The outcomes of the program were less beneficial for the outer islands
themselves. Members of settler families and spontaneous migrants initially
attracted to the transmigrant settlements occasionally eased local labor supply
problems for timber companies, and for small landholders and estate
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producers of cash crops. The roads built in association with transmigration
improved market access for timber, cash crops, and processing industries.
However, the major economic infusions to the outer islands weren't a result
of the transmigration program. Instead, major industrial and economic
developments in the outer islands through the 1970s came chiefly from oil
and natural exploration and production.

CONCLUSION

Two serious constraints emerged in the transmigration program. The
first being financial, the second, land availability. Most of the available land
on the outer islands was unusable. It was either mountainous or swampland.
What was available was often of poor soil quality or steep and subject to
erosion and leaching. Aside from these basic land limitations, there were
three factors which limited the land available for transmigration settlements.
First, emerging national and international recognition of land conservation
and rational exploitation of forest resources. Second, the native grasses which
grew in the uplands were traditional obstacles to conventional agricultural
production. Third, prior assertions to land claims by indigenous peoples of
the region.
The financial constraints and the costly efforts to improve conditions for
transmigrant via the provision of transportation, clearing and planting of
settlement sites, housing, food rations, irrigation, road construction, health,
education and welfare facilities, and expensive consultant services all
conspired to increase the cost to the government per transmigrant family.
Even with costs rising, the number of transmigrant families continued to
increase.

Until the 1980s the transmigration program and other national
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economic and social development projects were supportable with Indonesia's
oil revenue. The government began to recognize the competition between
the transmigration program and other programs for limited resources. Some
of the program costs were met by outside agencies such as the World Bank,
the International Development Agency, and the United Nation's World Food
Program. Indonesia has continued to struggle with funding the
transmigration program as economic resources become constrained.
With all the commitment to the transmigration program showed by the
Indonesian government over the years it would be unbelievable to
recommend abandonment. The program has demonstrated the courage of
policy makers and administrators to implement a scheme that is very capable
of moving very large numbers of transmigrant families from Java to the
outer islands. The program has also demonstrated support from the World
Bank which provided technical assistance to address immense logistic and
organizational problems.
There are problems, but with assistance, the program can address
deficiencies in administration. Assistance can help bring new technologies to
improve cropping patterns and animal husbandry. Developing new methods
of planting and cultivating trees such as rubber, oil palm, and coconut may
help to offset the low yields associated with the poor soils. Finally,
technological assistance to eradicate indigenous grasses and make swamp
reclamation less expensive could help to achieve one of the program's goals
of generating more food.

CHAPTERXIT

COMPARISON OF SETTLEMENT PROJECTS

The discussion in this chapter will examine the policies and
implementation of different resettlement projects and make an effort to
understand the problems facing settlement programs in different countries, to
understand the problems of what should or could have been done to
improve the settlements and their settlers' well-being. There are some
selective points of importance to be discussed, such as the performance of
settlements concerning their objective achievements. Other important points
include the the economic and social problems faced by settlements that
affected their success or failure. Additionally, examine resettlement policies
and their implications to determine if they were appropriate to solve the
problems of poverty, unemployment and population redistribution.

ACHIEVEMENT OF SETTLEMENT OBJECTIVE

Population Redistribution
In Indonesia, such an idea was not new. The colonial Dutch tried it in
1905, but for economic reasons rather than to relieve population pressures.
During independence, however, the process increased greatly between 1950
and 1977. A great number of the settlers moved independently throughout
most of the period. The program was much more successful in meeting its
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targets following 1977. The target for the five-year plan (1979-84) was to move
about 2 million people. It was not an easy task, but the government appeared
to have achieved it. Encouraged by this success, the government wanted to
move twice as many people in five years following 1984. However, relieving
population pressure by moving people from Java to South Sumatra had only
minimal impact because the population of Java increased by 35 million
during the same period.
In Malaysia, while population redistribution was never an objective of

land development programs, most settlers in Malaysia were from their own
states because most states had a quota requiring a minimum of 50 percent of
the settlers be from their own state. In this way projects succeed in retaining
migrants from rural villages within the rural areas. Rural-rural migration is
therefore encouraged, and thus minimizes rural-urban movement. This may
shed some light on Malaysia's relatively slow rate of urbanization, compared
with other developing countries.

Settlements and Development of New Areas
There are many reasons why a government develops an
underdeveloped area: to increase agricultural production; provide land for
landless or displaced people; relieve population pressures in overcrowded
areas; or to make use of new areas for industrial or manufacturing
development. Settlements are not then so much an end in themselves as a
means of achieving other goals.
The pilot land settlement project in Iraq was intended to solve the land
tenure problems in the southern reaches of the country. The outcomes were
expected to improve the peasants' lives by increasing agricultural production
and freeing them from landlord domination or control. Dujaila was very

successful during its first years of existence. Agricultural yields were
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promising and household incomes increased. Yet after the sixth year, the
lands under cultivation in the Dujaila project developed a salinity problem
that was beyond reclamation. Lack of a drainage system contributed to the
demise of agricultural productivity in the Dujaila project, and ultimately to
the failure of the intended goals of the land settlement scheme.
In the Philippines, the earliest settlement projects made use of the

frontier area to achieve their objectives. The unexplored areas of Mindanao
and the Cagayan Valley held potential resources that could be exploited.
Furthermore, a belief permeated the philosophy of settlement development
that an influx of Christian settlers into these regions would lead to the
assimilation of cultural minorities. This was an important goal in the early
settlement of the Mindanao regions.
The cultivation of unutilized land was also a major issue in parts of
Africa. In Somalia, about two-thirds of the population was made up of
nomadic tribes. Only 1.5 million of the 8 million hectares of land available
for cultivation was actually cultivated. Three agricultural and three fisheries
settlements were established to settle war refugees and the drought stricken
population, but the achievement of these settlements were much below
target. The original target laid down by the settlement development agency
for developing agricultural land during the five-year plan of 1974- 1978 was
56,000 hectares. This target was scaled down to 30,000 hectares. During the
next development plan of 1979- 1981, the settlement development agency's
objective was to develop 22,000 hectares. However, since 10,000 hectares of
this was to be in the Dujuma area, the overall target was reduced to 12,000
hectares when the Dujuma project was abandoned at the end of 1980, because
the land was found to be unsuitable for irrigated agriculture, and only small
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portions were suitable for rain-fed agriculture. Soon after, even this modest
goal was further scaled down to 3050 hectares. The analysis of Somalia
suggests that fisheries settlements were doing little better than the
agricultural settlements, although neither appear to have been sufficiently
successful in economic terms to be worth duplicating in future resettlement
programs.
The settlement program in Ethiopia started after the 1974 drought. The
goal was to settle about half a million people over a period of 10 years. By the
end of 1983, only 103,500 persons had been settled in 83 settlements.

Land for the Landless
In Malaysia, the principal objecti:ve was to develop land for the landless

and unemployed. In 1966 the government established an additional
organization aside from the Federal Land Development Agency, called the
Federal Land Consolidation and Rehabilitation Authority in order to assist
other poor rural groups such as those with small and fragmented holdings.
By the end of 1982, the Federal Land Development Agency had developed 331
projects with a total of 559,906 hectares of agricultural land, involving about
76,786 families.

Regional Development
Land settlement programs have sometimes been seen at least partly as a
means of promoting regional development, Regional development includes
the promotion of industry and trade, the exploration and processing of
minerals, forestry and other natural resources, and improvement of
transportation and communication necessary to integrate the region more
effectively into the national economy. Such programs in land development

for settlements seem too unrealistic. Land settlements are useful for the
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people who are given the opportunity to grow crops in somewhat better
conditions than where they were before. Settlements may provide social
relief for poor people but cannot contribute significantly to the industrial and
commercial development of the region.

Agricultural Development
Agricultural development is considered one of the most important
among the objectives of settlement programs. In Indonesia, the rate of
productivity in the northern Sumatran area was been higher than that in
southern Sumatra. In general, that productivity was low, except in the
settlements that had tree crops or irrigated rice fields. None of the other
settlements had returns anything like what the World Bank regards as the
minimum feasible if the program is to be economically justifiable.
Settlement programs have not always been so unsuccessful in achieving
their agricultural objectives. However, as I already reported before, the
frontier migration in the Philippines was a major factor in increasing
national agricultural output.
In Malaysia, land settlement projects made significant contributions to
the development and diversification of agriculture, although land settlement
in Malaysia created a small community of modern and relatively prosperous
rubber and oil palm landholders. Established rubber and oil palm
landholders appeared to play a significant role in making Malaysia the biggest
producer of palm oil in the world.
The OTZEM settlement in Israel, with its vegetable and fruit production
and processing plants for export, managed to keep about half the settlers
engaged in agricultural production.
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Improved Welfare of the Settlers
The settlement projects in general in the developing countries had noble
objectives: reducing poverty and raising the standard of living for those with
inadequate holdings of land, the landless, refugees, drought victims, and war
victims. It is thought that the settlements provided the settlers with better
incomes and that the concentration of people into settlements made it easier
to provide social services, such as housing, health care and education.

Settler Incomes
In Malaysia, it seems that rural farmers of any age who decided to join
the Federal Land Development Authority settlements enjoyed, after a few
years, steady increases in the level of their incomes compared with farmers of
the same age who did not join the settlement schemes.
In Indonesia, the settlers seemed to experience some improvements in
their incomes, although the evidence suggests that the benefits were on
average relatively small.

Social Services
In Tanzania, providing social services, such as clean water, education,
and health services, to large numbers of the rural population was among the
most notable achievements of the villagization schemes. Such services led to
a reduction in mortality, a reduction in the incidence of some diseases, and
implementation of technical and scientific innovation for social and
economic development. Since independence, the enrollment rate in primary
schools has almost tripled. One important social consequence of villagization
has been the improved position of women in society. Women are entitled to
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village membership and play an active role in communal agriculture. The

provision of clean water in many villages has relieved women from the hard
task of carrying water from far distances to the villages.
In Somalia, income and production objectives were not met. But the
settlements were quite successful in creating a social infrastructure that
contributed to improved hygiene, nutrition, and education opportunities for
large numbers of families.

PROBLEMS CONFRONTING SETTLEMENT PROGRAMS

Abandonment of Settlement Projects
When settlers were disappointed in their often unrealistically high
expectations, with poor settlement performance and achievement of
objectives, the tendency was for settlers to abandon the settlement and seek
other opportunities elsewhere.
In Ethiopia, there was a high rate of settler abandonment, the reason
being settlers were not allowed to bring in their families. This caused a
shortage of labor and low productivity.
In Somalia, the productivity in settlements was so low the income of the
settlers was below the target level and was not adequate. As a result, many of
the settlers, especially the adult males, abandoned the settlements in search of
work elsewhere, leaving behind the children and the older members of the
families so that they could take advantage of the free education and the
health and housing facilities available in the settlements.
In Indonesia, lack of facilities, such as housing, clean water, roads for
marketing and scarcity of nonagricultural employment were among the
important factors that led settlers to abandon the settlement projects.

Lack of Nonagricultural Employment and Second Generation Problems
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Non-farm employment is an area where most settlement projects seem
to have failed totally. In Malaysia, where the land settlement programs were
an integrated component of regional development, the problems were not
solved. The size of the settlement plot was perhaps enough to provide a
minimum existence for the family, if only family labor was utilized and the
needs of the family small. However, as the family grows, the shortcomings of
the small plot and it production potential become apparent. Malaysia had
rigid principles that settler's land could not be subdivided, for small holdings
were uneconomic. This meant the settler's dependents had to leave the land
settlement to seek employment elsewhere.
In Israel, in the OTZEM settlement, half of its population were employed

outside the settlement. Under such circumstances, what was needed was the
establishment of urban-based industries and some kinds of activities in the
settlement projects or nearby. This had not been achieved. Thus, although
land settlement programs gave potential rural-urban migrants the alternative
of remaining in the rural areas, they could play only a temporary role in
combating rural-urban migration.

Social Tensions Between Settlers and Original Populations
Tensions could arise between two groups of people if the settlers are
perceived to have more or bigger landholdings and better social services or to
be encroaching on land traditionally farmed by the local community.

Ecological problems
Most such problems are seen in many Latin American countries*. The

*

Latin American countries are not included in this study.
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practice of shifting cultivation by settlers have resulted in the excessive
deforestation and serious ecological and climatic deterioration that occurred
in the different basins of the forest highlands. In Peru, for example, during
the period 1925-1984, approximately 7 million hectares of forest were
destroyed. The cultivation of crops unsuitable to cleared forest also
contributed to environmental problems. (Hyman 1984 ).

CHAPTERXIll

SETILEMENT SUCCESS OR FAILURE

The purpose of this chapter is to understand the performance of national
resettlement projects in many Third World countries. The major focus of the
discussion will be on the similarities and differences in the policies and
implementation of different resettlement projects, to identify the problems
facing settlement programs, and to understand what should or could be done
to improve settlement outcome.
Lack of detailed and comprehensive planning was one of the most
important factors contributing to poor performance of settlement programs.
In the case of the Dujaila project in Iraq, there was no serious attention paid to

preparing a master plan for the area or region. The project failed within six
years. Settlements in Ethiopia and Somalia also suffered from a lack of
planning. Because they were conceived during a period of national
emergency, settlements usually tended to be created long before any social or
economic planning was carried out.
In Ethiopia and Somalia things were done quickly, and ambitious and

unrealistic goals were set to be achieved in far too short a time. The
resettlement at Dujama in Somalia had to be abandoned five years after it was
established because of the salinity of the soil. The same thing happened in
the Dujaila project in Iraq, which had to be abandoned six years after it was
started.
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The most important of factor of planning settlements was the suitability
of the site. As mentioned above, the Dujuma project in Somalia and the
Dujaila project in Iraq had to be abandoned after five and six years
respectively because the salinity of the soil made them unsuitable for
cultivation. Poor choice of sites was also a problem in Ethiopia.
There are many things as far as the selection of site that must be kept in
mind. First, the physical condition must be appropriate; second, the soil
should be in top condition and fertile; third, the rainfall must be adequate or
there must be easy access to irrigation; fourth, the drainage system must be
adequate. The settlement must be accessible to essential services as well as
markets for the settlers' produce at production time. Settlement projects in
many Third World countries have failed where these considerations have
not been properly understood. In some cases, settlement sites were selected
without prior studies of the quality of land or other considerations, such as
rainfall and irrigation. Some settlements were in remote locations, near
borders or in disturbed areas which faced serious security problems.
The size of the plot of the holding was a very important factor in
attracting settlers. There were two main principles used in determining the
settlers' plots: (1) the plot must be large enough to provide settlers with a
better living than what they had in their area of origin, and; (2) the plot must
not be larger than the settler can cultivate. Land or farm size must vary,
however, with the type of crop, market conditions, soil management and
technology available.
It is not a good policy to place settlers on a holding that does not provide

them with the ability to change the number of dependents or produce enough
food crop for their survival. A very small holding will not provide the
necessary income; conversely, holdings that are too large will favor

employment of non-family labor and most probably will result in the
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exploitation of permanent non-family labor.
Selection of settlers involves issues that are very complex and very
important. The selection criteria depend on the national objectives. As some
differ from one country to another, it is very difficult to provide a general
standard of selection. One important thing that should be done is a clear
explanation should be given to applicants at the time of selection of what will
be expected of them and what they can expect in return, so that people do not
come in with a misunderstanding of what the settlement project is all about.
An opportunity to be part of a settlement project often raises people's

expectations even in successful settlements. This may contribute to
settlement failure. Settlements in general require a major commitment from
the settlers, but few families are prepared to wait 10 or more years for results
that they feel should come immediately.
In some countries, the selection criteria was biased in favor of young

people. Such conditions meant that villages in rural areas were losing
energetic and young labor. Such migration effects of land development
projects on the areas losing labor have yet to be studied.
The selection priority given to agriculturists with experience obviously
had merit, though the principle need not be rigidly applied in all types of
settlements. For example, where the chief objective of a resettlement is to
resettle refugees or for national security, insistence on agricultural experience
would be misplaced.
Some selection procedures were open to abuse. In Indonesia, little
emphasis on agricultural experience has tended to serve as an excuse for
including in transmigrant groups all kinds of unskilled and unwanted
people.

There were some merits in resettling people who speak the same
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language, belong to the same tribe, or come from the same background. It
seems such an approach contributed to the minimization of social conflicts.
The selection preference for settlers with capital should also be assessed
within the context of the overall objectives of resettlement. If, as in the
majority of cases, land settlement schemes are designed specifically for the
most disadvantaged of the population, then giving priority to those with
capital conflicts with the overall intention. As far as the success or failure of
individual settlers is concerned, of course, those with capital have a greater
chance of success than those without. However, capital wealth is not the only
prerequisite for a settler's success.
Land tenure defines the rights and obligations with respect to
landholding and use of such land in agricultural settlements. The ideal land
tenure system is one that provides adequate incentives to produce and to
invest. It should afford reasonable income and security to those who farm
the land. A good tenure system can also exist for generating adequate
employment and promoting a more equal distribution of income.
In general, the approaches with which planners in different third world

countries can create alternative tenure systems is greatly constrained by
sociopolitical factors. Within these constraints, however, several general
considerations apply. Equity and security are essential under any tenure
system. Subdivision into uneconomic units should be strongly discouraged.
Settlers must be aware of their rights and obligations, and the settlement
authority must have the necessary enforcement authority. Settlers' rights
over the land should carry a direct relationship to their contributions to land
development. However, governments must impose some restrictions on the
conditions of land titles; without such conditions, the settlers would either
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sell the land and thus become landless or subdivide the holding among their
children and make the land uneconomic for production.
Good management is important in indicating a settlement's degree of

success. Management is an integral part of the land development process,
and implementation of it needs all the help and assistance of all government
departments, especially the settlement agency.
To be successful, resettlement operations require a gradual transfer of
responsibility from settlement agencies to the settlers. Otherwise, a
relationship of dependency may occur, and all agency resources may become
tied up in limited numbers of permanently supervised projects.
In many land settlement projects in Asia and Africa, dependency

discourages self-mobilization and undermines the settlers' commitment to
self-reliance and development and increases the costs of settlement. Care
must be taken to avoid putting the thought in the minds of the settlers that
they have become permanent wards of the state. This is an example of what
happened in Somalia. There were fewer work incentives, and family
incomes were not given adequate consideration. The settlement agencies
have provided the settlers with all their basic needs. Similar problems have
occurred in Ethiopia.

PLANNED AND SPONTANEOUS SETTLEMENTS

As noted earlier, planned settlements required a large degree of
government involvement, including selection of settlers and types of
services, and financial aid. In planned settlements, the questions is how
much responsibility should be left to the individual settlers and how much
should be guided by the settlement authority. The answer is very hard to

determine. The ideal, of course, is to have both combined together, but it
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largely depends on the type of project and the types of crops to be produced.
On the other hand, if the crops are grown for sale, and if the settlers' farms are
to be economically viable, some central authority must organize all matters
that are best done on a large scale, such as irrigation, mechanics operations,
technical advice, processing and marketing of the crops, and purchase of
supplies.
A study done by the World Bank in 1978 suggested that about two-thirds
of the rate of rural land settlement was due to spontaneous settlement.
Although spontaneous migration without government assistance is
widespread, it does present problems of its own. Spontaneous settlements
take a long time to become available, and unsupervised farming has a
tendency to disregard proper land management and produces erosion and
other environmental problems. However, in spite of the bad reputation of
spontaneous settlement because of natural resource destruction, it does offer
the best chance of success in developing new land where capital and
administrative resources are scarce.

CHAPTER XIV

CONCLUSION

Similar to the research done by Oberai (1988) and Levi (1988), my
research into land settlement programs in some Third World countries has
led me to believe the programs made no more than a modest contribution to
the problems of population distribution, unemployment, and poverty. Very
few settlements reached their objectives. Some increase in agricultural
production and an improvement in settlers' standards of living was apparent
in some countries. The overall impact on employment and production was
limited.
Even with such limited success, land settlement programs are popular in
many Third World countries because they are politically more desirable and
easier to establish than other rural reform programs. While the cost per
settler of successful settlements was high, even with government assistance,
the total number of settlers involved in settlement projects has been small in
comparison with the total number of any given nation's people in need of
assistance.
To be successful, the planning and implementation of settlement
projects requires a close look at the essential needs of the settlers. A very high
priority should be given to providing community infrastructure and social
services such as housing, schools, health care, and water supplies.
Government help for housing should be limited to helping with site
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selection and planning, provision of building materials on credit, and
technical assistance. This should help make settlers self-reliant and reduce
the risk of creating dependent farmers.
When low productivity in settlements result in low incomes for the
settlers, it is very important that the problems should be overcome by
introduction of incentives. The provision of training and favorable prices for
the settlers' goods, produce, and services would contribute to improved
productivity. In some countries, as in Latin America, the practice of shifting
cultivation by settlers and the resultant excessive deforestation are major
factors contributing to the serious ecological deterioration that is being
experienced in those countries. There is, thus, an urgent need to improve
agricultural technology and to provide educational programs for the settlers
covering various aspects of environmental protection.
Government plans to settle nomadic tribes must understand nomadic
lives as a cultural system that has evolved over several centuries. From their
movement, they derive not only subsistence, but the values and satisfaction
of their particular way of life. The idea of settling them in agricultural areas
at huge cost, therefore, needs to be reconsidered. In Somalia, for example,
about one-third of nomad settlers have abandoned settlement projects.
Help for the nomads must first take the form of helping them to make
better use of the resources they have, rather than attempting to settle them.
This could be done by creating growth centers of attraction where they are
provided with water, food, livestock feed, training, health and veterinary
services, and other social services. This would reduce the radius of their
movement, and as these centers of attraction grow in size, they would
probably develop into settlements. Such a strategy is likely to be more
successful and cost effective than a settlement program. Alternatively, a
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policy of encouraging voluntary, spontaneous settlement of nomads in
regions where agricultural potential is greatest may be a more efficient
alternative to planned settlement projects.
It is not sufficient, however, to look at settlements simply in terms of
their agricultural potential. Purely agricultural settlements are inadequate for
present day needs. Most settlement planners and implementers fail to give
consideration in project design to generating non-farm employment,
especially for settlers' children as they get older and enter into the labor force.
Land settlements should be planned within an integrated regional
framework that includes development of related agro-industrial and service
sectors. One country that has attempted to provide non-agricultural
employment is the United Republic of Tanzania. Overall, settlement
schemes suggest that resettlement should not simply move people physically
from one region to another, but should embrace more concerted and
imaginative planning and implementation strategies in the areas designated
for settlement. Settlers must be provided with basic infrastructural facilities,
and some improvement in income if they are to remain within a project.
There is a need to review the implementation strategies for new
settlements based on the costs and benefits of alternative means of increasing
agricultural production and achieving equitable distribution of land and
incomes. Possibilities include intensification of cultivation and
comprehensive land reforms. Even so, land settlement, spontaneous or
directed, may well continue for reasons such as population distribution,
accommodation of war refugees, and drought.
Land settlement should not be considered either as an end in itself or as
a means of redistributing the population. It should be conceived as a strategy
for creating viable communities. To be successful, the planning and
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implementation of settlements requires meeting the essential needs of the
settlers and providing community infrastructure and social services, such as
housing, schools, health care and water supplies.
Overall, settlement projects suggest that resettlement should not be
simply physically moving people from one area to another, but rather should
be more concerted in their planning The areas of destination should be more
fully examined, accounting for basic human needs. Settlers must be provided
with infrastructure facilities, roads, transportation, and improvement in
income if they are to remain within the project.
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